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1 Introduction
Governance goes hand-in-hand with development. It is well-established that the quality of governance is
positively correlated with income per capita and a number of variables associated with development (e.g.
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999).1 In fact, if we interpret the concept broadly as concerning the
institutional environment and the ability to implement collective choices (Baland, Moene and Robinson
2009), it has been often argued that it is central in understanding different development paths (e.g.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2005). In any event, there can be little doubt that the quality of
governance directly affects the provision of public goods, and thus matters greatly for welfare.
But governance is clearly endogenous, emerging as part of a collective choice by a society. Since
good governance imposes limits on the extent to which rulers and elites can appropriate the apparatus
of government to their own benefit, understanding it requires understanding the constraints under which
these rulers and elites operate. This is particularly elusive in contexts where there are relatively few
explicit, formally established checks and balances, such as those imposed by a well-functioning democratic
process through which incumbents might be held accountable.
One constraint that looms large in such contexts is the threat of insurrection and conflict. It is
pervasive across weakly institutionalized regimes, and many have studied the emergence of institutions as
a result of latent social conflict and (the threat of) violence, e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Besley
and Persson (2009), Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), or Guimaraes and Sheedy (2013).
We study one specific element that interacts with this threat to affect the extent of informal constraints
on rulers: the spatial distribution of a country’s population relative to the seat of political power. We
start off with the recognition, motivated by the historical evidence, that capital cities have often played a
pivotal role in determining the outcome of insurgencies and revolutionary standoffs – and that incumbents
react to the incentives posed by this role. It is then natural to ask about its implications for the quality
of governance.
We develop a theoretical framework to shed light on these questions. Specifically, we model an incum-
bent elite that can extract rents, but is subject to the threat of rebellions from dissatisfied citizens. Our
key assumption is that rebellions are more effective when they take place closer to the capital city. This
embodies the principle that “spatial proximity to power increases political influence” (Ades and Glaeser
1995, p.198), and especially so when that influence is mediated by the threat of violence.
Our first central result is that conflict is more likely to emerge closer to the capital city. Relatedly,
we also find that, conditional on its emergence, conflict is more likely to dislodge the incumbent regime
when it happens close to the capital. Intuitively, it is cheaper for incumbents to obtain a given amount of
stability by buying off those who live far away: they can be placated with less, because they represent a
lesser threat. Incumbents are thus willing to live with a greater probability of conflict closer to the capital,
1It is still open to debate whether this represents causality in one way or the other, or perhaps both (e.g. Kaufman and
Kraay 2002, Sachs et al. 2004).
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in spite of the greater danger it entails.
We then extend the model to consider the endogenous choice of the degree of isolation of the capital
city, and of the quality of governance. The former captures the tradeoff between protecting against the
threat of conflict by locating the seat of political power in an isolated place, and the economic inefficiencies
from doing so.2 The latter in turn encapsulates the choice of whether to share power more broadly. This
allows for greater productivity, to the extent that the existence of checks and balances enables the use
of more productive technologies that require public goods such as the rule of law or the enforcement of
contracts. Such “good governance”, however, imposes costs on the elite, because it requires that any rents
that they extract be shared more broadly with those with whom power is shared.
This interplay yields our second key result: a negative correlation between the isolation of the capital
city and the quality of governance. This reflects causality going in both directions. On the one hand,
a more isolated capital induces less power sharing: when incumbent elites are more protected against
the threat of rebellion, they can extract rents more easily. This means a smaller incentive to choose
good governance, since that implies sharing those rents more widely. On the other hand, bad governance
increases the incentive to isolate the capital, because incumbents in a less productive economy will worry
less about the losses induced by that additional isolation.
The empirical evidence is very much consistent with the key predictions of our framework. We start by
looking at worldwide geolocated data on the onset and prevalence of conflict. We first show that intrastate
conflict is more likely to start and to occur in places that are closer to the capital city. This is true if
we average all available years in the sample and compare grid cells, controlling for income, population,
and a number of geographical variables (including broad measures of isolation unrelated to the capital
city). Importantly, this is also true if we make use of the panel variation, controlling for grid-cell fixed
effects and hence identifying the effect using changes in country borders and capital city moves, both of
which are arguably exogenous with respect to cell characteristics. We thus find both that conflict is more
likely in places that are closer to the capital, and also that for a given place it becomes more likely when
the capital is moved closer to that place. Finally, we show that, at the country level, there is a greater
likelihood of regime change when the spatial distribution of civil conflict is more concentrated around the
capital city, further confirming our first central prediction.
Of note, these empirical patterns hold only for relatively non-democratic countries. This is consistent
with them being driven by the logic our model highlights, since it is in autocratic contexts that the threat
of conflict should gain salience as a constraint on rulers, as a result of the relative dearth of regular means
of replacing them. Similarly, we reassuringly find no link between conflict and distance to the capital when
it comes to interstate conflict, as the model should not apply to that context either. Last but certainly
not least, our findings are pointedly inconsistent with what one might have expected from alternative
2We take the choice of location of the capital city as a short-hand description for all the policy levers that affect the spatial
distribution of individuals relative to the capital city, of which actually relocating the capital is just a relatively extreme
example – though, as we will see, not that infrequently used or contemplated – alongside migration policies, specific economic
incentives to populate certain areas, and so forth.
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explanations: for instance, if the link were driven by weak state capacity, it would stand to reason that
conflict would be more likely farther from the capital, as the reach of the state grows feebler.
We then look at the link between capital cities and governance. We find robust evidence that isolated
capitals are indeed associated with misgovernance, controlling for a number of variables that are reckoned
to correlate with quality of governance and isolation of the capital, and using different ways of measuring
these concepts.
A number of additional pieces of evidence reinforce our confidence that this correlation indeed captures
the operation of the forces highlighted by our theory. First, we once again find that the correlation is
present only for relatively non-democratic countries. Second, when we unpack the definition of governance,
we see that in fact the autocracies where the capital city is in an isolated location have governments that
are less effective, less accountable, more corrupt, and less able or willing to sustain the rule of law; however,
they are not more unstable. This is consistent with the logic of our model, which postulates that isolation
is a way of protecting against the threat of removal. We also show that there is no correlation between
isolated capitals and measures of government performance that are unrelated to the kind of institutional
incentives our framework highlights, suggesting that our stylized fact is unlikely to be driven by some
unrelated correlation between isolated capitals and lack of state capacity.
Similarly, we find evidence that the correlation is indeed about the role of the capital city: controlling
for the isolation of the country’s largest city other than the capital leaves results unaffected. Along with
the evidence on conflict, this is reassuring against the possibility that isolation from the capital might have
been proxying for factors related to the state’s ability to supply a high-quality institutional infrastructure
to relatively isolated places. Finally, we also find direct evidence that isolated capital cities are associated
with less power sharing, as captured by constraints on executive power and by the extent of political
competition.
The model also yields ancillary testable predictions, and the evidence is again supportive. First, it
predicts that, since the capital’s inhabitants pose a more serious rebellion threat, incumbent elites will
leave them larger rents, and also that this premium will be larger when the capital is more isolated. We
find evidence that income per capita in the capital city (relative to that of the country as a whole) is indeed
higher in non-democratic countries with more isolated capitals. Finally, the model predicts that military
spending will be higher in countries were the capital city is less isolated, inasmuch as such spending can
be used as an alternative source of protection. This is also borne out by the data, and again only for the
sample of relatively non-democratic countries.
This paper relates to a range of different strands of literature. It fits directly into the one that
stresses the political implications of spatial distributions, both in economics (e.g. Ades and Glaeser 1995,
Davis and Henderson 2003) and in political science (e.g. Rodden 2010). In fact, the importance of the
spatial distribution of population and its connection with the threat of rebellion facing rulers has long been
recognized by an important group: rulers themselves. As we discuss in detail later, the history of decisions
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on where to locate capital cities makes it remarkably clear that protection against perceived instability
threat is a pervasive concern behind capital relocations, either planned or actually implemented – and
they are typically in the direction of increased isolation.
We emphasize the special role of the capital city, and in that we are closely related to Campante and
Do (2014). That paper looks at how the spatial distribution of population and the isolation of capital cities
affect government performance across US states, by conditioning the degree of accountability provided
by the news media and the electoral process. We look here at a very different mechanism, related to the
threat of conflict, which we show to be in force in a very different, non-democratic context.3 Another
crucial distinction is that, while that paper points at a direction of causality running from the isolation
of the capital to governance, we argue here that the reverse direction is just as important in the case of
weakly institutionalized polities, as incumbents have considerably more influence in affecting the spatial
distribution of population relative to the capital.4
Another related literature has studied how the isolation of countries or their geographical size affects
institutions and development – such as Nunn and Puga (2012) and Ashraf, Galor and Ozak (2010). In
different ways, both papers argue that isolation may have a positive effect on development by reducing
the risk of external conflict, even if it may have other negative effects such as through reduced trade.
Neither paper deals with the specific institutional role of the capital city, and its isolation with respect
to the country’s population. On a different vein, Stasavage (2010) emphasizes how geographical distances
from European capital cities might have hindered the historical development of representative institutions
through reduced accountability, though his historical data do not allow for consideration of the spatial
distribution of population.
As previously mentioned, we also build on the literature on the endogenous emergence of institutions,
and their implications for development. In particular, we address the broad question of the persistence
of inefficient institutions (e.g. Acemoglu 2006). We identify the spatial distribution of individuals as a
novel source of variation in the constraints that underpin institutional choices, which may leave agents
who stand to benefit from those inefficient institutions better able to get away with their preferences. We
3While that paper’s results seem in tension with our finding of an absence of a link between the degree of isolation and
governance in established democracies, they can be reconciled quite naturally: as much as there is a real difference between
the extent of corruption in, say, Minnesota and Louisiana, this is evidently swamped by the variation across countries. It is
not surprising that the cross-country evidence is painted with strokes that are too broad to detect the effect of the subtler
mechanisms that are in play in established democracies, and which our theory here leaves aside.
4This two-way feedback underscores the difficulty of empirically disentangling causality running one way or the other. In
particular, it is hard to think of sources of exogenous variation, at the cross-country level, that affect isolation without affecting
governance. (For instance, Pierskalla (2012) provides evidence that a long history of statehood increases the concentration of
population around the capital, but it stands to reason that such history would also directly affect governance in other ways
(Chanda and Putterman 2005).) The source of exogenous variation used by Campante and Do (2014) – the location of a
state’s centroid – is unfortunately not relevant in the context of the countries we focus on: the equanimous, republican logic of
locating the capital at a relatively central position, which underlies the first-stage relationship accross US states, was bound
to be much less influential to the decisions of autocrats and/or colonial powers concerning the designation of the capital. As
noted by Herbst (2000, p. 16), with respect to Africa, “[most] colonial capitals were located on the coast, demonstrating
the low priority of extending power inland compared to the need for easy communication and transport links with Europe.”
These capitals by and large persisted as such after independence. Unsurprisingly, there is no correlation between the isolation
of the capital city and the isolation of the centroid within our sample of autocracies.
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are also close to the recent strand of that literature that has tried to unpack the evolution of political
institutions along different dimensions, such as checks and balances, power sharing, and political stability
(e.g. Besley, Persson, and Reynal-Querol 2013). We provide further support for the view that these can
interact in subtle ways, and move in separate directions as a result.
Last but not least, we contribute to the voluminous literature on intrastate conflict and civil wars (see
Blattman and Miguel 2010 for a survey). Our focus is on one of the possible motivations for conflict,
namely attempts to bring down an incumbent regime – as opposed, say, to separatist conflict – and even
more narrowly, on its spatial dimensions. Still, we relate directly to the strand within that literature that
considers the role of geographic and demographic factors (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003), and in doing
so we address several of the aspects highlighted by Sambanis (2005) as in need of empirical exploration:
distinctions between established democracies and more fragile environments, geographic concentration
of power, or the degree of state control over a country’s geographic periphery. As we have argued, our
results go against the more standard presumption that isolated areas are more prone to conflict, further
illustrating the value of considering the special role of capital cities.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the motivating historical
evidence on revolutions and capital cities; Section 3 analyzes the model and its implications; Section 4
discusses the empirical evidence; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Revolutions and Capital Cities
Physical proximity to the stronghold of government matters critically when it comes to removing it by
force: a relatively small mob in the capital city poses as much of a threat as a much larger group of
rebels elsewhere. It follows that the population in and around the capital is especially important in these
contexts, as can be illustrated by a brief look at a few revolutionary episodes over the past three centuries.
A classic example is the transition century from the Ancien Re´gime to the Third Republic, in France.
Around the time of the French Revolution, the 550 thousand people living in Paris certainly did not
represent the average or median opinion of some 29 million Frenchmen, among which many royalists
willing to defend the monarchy at all costs.6 While turmoil in the countryside was certainly important
leading up and in the aftermath of the Revolution (Markoff 1996), it is rather clear that the Parisian crowd
packed a far heavier revolutionary punch, as described by Tilly (2003 p. 162-167), than those anywhere
else. As put by Traugott (1995) in his analysis of French insurrections during the following century:
5For instance, Buhaug and Rod (2006) find evidence, using African data, that separatist conflict is more likely in isolated
areas near national borders, and farther from the capital, where control by the central government is weaker (Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou 2014). In contrast, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) find that conflict in Africa seems to be more likely
closer to the capital city, in line with our results.
6National and city population figures come from estimates of McEvedy and Jones (1978), and from Braudel (1986), who
observed that France at the end of the Ancien Re´gime was still very much a rural country. Later on, royalist counter-
revolutionaries rioted in Brittany, La Vande´e and Dauphine´, regions too far from Paris to make any difference.
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“In general, the rural population proved acquiescent, but the will of the capital initially
held sway even when the numerical majority living in the countryside seemed resistant to the
change. (...) For the period in question, the relationship between insurrections and changes of
regime in France is simple to describe: as Paris goes, so goes the nation.” (p.148)7
The logic linking revolutions and capital cities is by no means limited to 18th- and 19th-century France,
of course. As put by The Economist, in the context of the 2006 “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine –
and as was repeated in the same country in 2014 – “during a [revolutionary] stand-off, the capital city is
crucial.”(March 18th 2006, p. 28) The lingering political turmoil in Thailand, in recent years, is another
example of how hard it is for a government to stay in power if it lacks support from the population of
the capital city, even when such government was largely popular in the countryside (The Economist, Sep.
22nd, 2006). By the same token, incumbent regimes are obviously especially concerned with securing the
capital city when the threat of rebellion becomes acute (e.g. Arriola 2013 on the case of Ethiopia).
To be sure, the power of the capital is not absolute – for instance, many have emphasized that isolation
may help insurgencies by making repression more difficult, as in Mao Zedong’s well-known account of
guerrilla warfare (Mao 1961). The importance of the capital, however, is underscored by the many
incumbent rulers who have tried to manipulate the concentration of population around the capital by
moving the latter – more often than not with alleviating revolutionary pressure as one of the explicit, or
barely concealed, goals.
It is not hard to come up with examples from history. In the 17th century, Louis XIV moved away
from the Parisian masses into the tranquility of Versailles, a move that is thought to have been influenced
by his dislike of Paris, stemming from having witnessed and suffered the rebellions against the Crown
that became known as the Frondes (1648-53), as argued by the contemporary account of the Duc de
Saint-Simon. Modern examples are also easy to come by, and many other countries have fiddled with the
idea, even if falling short of carrying it through. In just about every case, a chief concern was to have
the new capitals to be “quiet, orderly places where civil servants could get on with their jobs without
distraction.”(The Economist, Dec. 18th 1997)
Looking closely at a couple of these modern examples helps illuminate that logic. Brazil had the
capital moved in 1960 from Rio de Janeiro to Bras´ılia – many hundreds of kilometers away from the main
population centers of Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, and far from the coast, where most of the country’s
population was and still is. As Couto (2001) remarks, one of the factors motivating the president who
decided to build the new capital from scratch, Juscelino Kubitschek, was a desire to escape from the
atmosphere of political agitation in Rio, where the president was more exposed to political crises and
student demonstrations. As he himself put it, rather colorfully: “A tramway strike in Rio de Janeiro may
7While not every Parisian insurrection managed to change the status quo like those in 1830 and 1848 did, they indeed
occurred in a remarkably recurrent pattern: 1827, 1830, 1832, 1834, 1839, 1848, 1849, 1851, 1869, and 1871. Interestingly,
insurrections of considerable size originating elsewhere in the country, including the 1831 and 1834 revolts of the canuts (silk
workers) in Lyon, the second largest city, “systematically failed to produce comparable repercussions at the national level
unless they coincided with unrest in the capital” (Traugott 1995, p.148). (See also Bezucha, 1974 and Montagne, 1966).
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bring down the President of the Republic.” (Couto, 2001, p. 199, our translation)
The recent move in Myanmar (Burma), in 2005, from the major population center of Yangon (Rangoon)
to the fortified “secret mountain compound” of Naypyidaw is another illuminating, if somewhat extreme
example. (International Herald Tribune, Nov 11th 2005) As put by Varadarajan (2007):
“Vast and empty, Burma’s new capital will not fall to an urban upheaval easily. It has
no city centre, no confined public space where even a crowd of several thousand people could
make a visual – let alone political – impression. Naypyitaw (sic), then, is the ultimate insur-
ance against regime change, a masterpiece of urban planning designed to defeat any putative
“colour revolution” – not by tanks and water cannons, but by geometry and cartography. 320
kilometres to the south, Rangoon, with five million people, is home to one-tenth the country’s
population. But even if that city were brought to a standstill by public protests and demon-
strations, Burma’s military government – situated happily in the middle of paddy fields in the
middle of nowhere – would remain unaffected.”
As if to emphasize this design, the city was deliberately planned without mobile phone coverage, and
civil servants were not allowed to take their spouses or children along when they originally moved (Htay
2007). These are measures that are hard to justify under the oft-mentioned rationales of developing an
underpopulated part of the country or protecting against foreign invasion.
This pattern can be seen more systematically with the help of Table 1. This table lists all instances
in which capital cities were moved, on a permanent basis, by formally independent countries since World
War I, with the corresponding distances and population numbers (for as close to the event as could be
found).8 The first thing to note is that these are not rare episodes: on average, capital moves happen
once every six years – the 1930s were the only decade that did not see one – and there are examples
from every continent. Most importantly from our standpoint, the table also shows that the moves are
overwhelmingly in the direction of greater isolation, at least under the rough measure of capital primacy
(share of population in the capital city). This pattern might have been expected, since the capital is more
often than not the largest city in the country, but what is striking is that the typical new capitals is a lot
smaller than the old one – quite a few times, a new city built from scratch. In short, rulers and regimes
that have chosen to move their capital cities have most often picked a considerably more isolated location.
In sum, the population concentrated in and around the capital city matters more than those located
elsewhere, from a political standpoint, particularly when it comes to extra-institutional channels such
as revolutions and riots (as opposed to competitive, democratic elections). Just as importantly, rulers
recognize that and react. This might involve the relatively extreme policy lever of picking or influencing
the location of the capital city, which we have used to illustrate the point, but we should also stress
that many others are available. For instance, they can try to placate discontent arising in the capital,
8Sources are listed in an online Data Appendix. Exceptions involving temporary moves, or moves within a 10km radius
are listed in the notes below the table.
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  Table 1. Changes in Capital Cities since World War I 
Country From To Year Distance (km) 
Population 
(From) Population (To) 
              
Russia St. Petersburg Moscow 1918 633 2.3 million (1917) 1.8 million (1915) 
Turkey Istanbul Ankara 1923 351 680K (1927) 75K (1927) 
Australia Melbourne Canberra 1927 472 670K (1914) - 
China Nanjing Beijing 1949 1219 2.8 million (1955) 2.8 million (1953) 
Mauritania - Nouakchott 1957 - - 200 (1957) 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro Brasilia 1960 754 3.1 million (1960) - 
Rwanda Butare Kigali 1962 80 n.a. 6K (1962) 
North Yemen Ta'izz Sana'a 1962 198 87K (1975) 135K (1975) 
Pakistan Karachi Islamabad 1966 1144 1.9 million (1961) - 
Malawi Zomba Lilongwe 1974 227 24K (1977) 99K (1977) 
Cote d'Ivoire Abidjan Yamoussoukro 1983 228 1.2 million (1978) 200K (2005) 
Chile* Santiago Valparaiso 1990 98 4.6 million (1990) 800K (2002) 
Nigeria Lagos Abuja 1991 541 5.7 million (1991) - 
Tanzania* Dar-es-Salaam Dodoma 1996 571 2.3 million (2002) 213K (2002) 
Kazakhstan Almaty Astana 1997 974 1.1 million (1999) 281K (1999) 
Malaysia** Kuala Lumpur Putrajaya 1999 47 1.7 million (2000) 70K (2000) 
Myanmar (Burma) Yangon Naypyidaw 2005 330 4.1 million (2007) - 
              
*Legislative only; **Executive only. Multiple sources (see online appendix). We include designation of capital cities by independent countries; any 
designation at the time of independence is included only if chosen capital is different from colonial capital. (Mauritania had no colonial capital.) Instances 
where capital cities were moved within the same metopolitan area (<10km), namely Philippines (1975) and Sri Lanka (1982), are not included. (West) 
Germany (1990) and Albania (1920) are not included, since in these cases the existing regimes had maintained temporary capitals pending reunification 
and completion of independence process, respectively. "n.a." stands for "not available". Distance is measured "as the crow flies". All cities are referred 
to by their current English designations. 
or otherwise influence the distribution of population around the capital – say, with special incentives or
coercion towards populating certain areas of the country, or with restrictions on domestic migration. Stark
examples of such policies are not hard to come by either: from relatively benign registration systems that
discourage internal migration (especially to cities) – such as the Chinese hukou or the Vietnamese ho khau
– to more extreme cases such as the mass deportation of ethnic groups and the confinement of dissidents
to remote areas in the Soviet Union, or the forced depopulation of cities during the reign of the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia. As with capital city moves, these are all policies that are not motivated solely by a
desire to isolate the capital, but it is telling that one can hardly find examples of such regimes encouraging
their populations to move closer. It is just as telling that they often specifically target groups considered
particularly dangerous in terms of kindling insurgencies.
3 Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: A Theory
Against this background, we now propose a theory of the joint determination of the quality of institutions
and the degree of isolation of the capital city, in which this determination is mediated by the threat of
conflict. Groups of individuals who are dissatisfied with existing institutions, under which an incumbent
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elite can extract rents from its citizens, can challenge them by rebelling. Our key assumption is that those
who are closer to the capital city – the seat of political power – will (coeteris paribus) pose a greater threat
in that regard.
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of individuals of measure one. A measure p of
individuals are in power (the “incumbent elite”, or “incumbents”), and the remaining individuals are
“citizens”. In order to capture the special role of the capital city in as simple a fashion as possible, we
posit that there are two places where citizens can locate: the capital, denoted by C , and elsewhere, which
we denote by F (for “faraway”). We denote the fraction of citizens living in F by `, which thus captures
the degree of isolation of the capital city. Hence there will be a measure (1− p)` of citizens in F , and a
measure (1− p)(1− `) in C .
3.1 Capital Cities and Conflict
We start by studying the simplest possible environment, in which the degree of isolation of the capital
and the quality of governance are taken as given, in order to focus on the link between capital cities
and conflict. Specifically, we take both p and ` to be exogenous. In addition, we assume an endowment
economy, with output exogenously set at some Y ∗. The only decision we will consider in this simple model
is that incumbents choose how much of that output they will get for themselves, and how much they will
leave for citizens.
3.1.1 Conflict
Let us describe the rebellion technology.9 In order to allow for conflict arising from different locations, we
assume that there are n groups of citizens, each with the same size, and also (for the moment) that group
membership does not cut across different locations: either all individuals in group ı are in F (`ı = 1), or
they are all in C (`ı = 0).10
Define the net potential gain from conflict for group ı as:
γı ≡ y
∗
wı
− ψı, (1)
where y∗ is a constant, wı is the available income for group ı, chosen by the incumbents, and ψı is a
random variable representing the cost of engaging in conflict. (In Appendix A, we show a simple model
that microfounds this reduced-form formulation.)11
More precisely, the cost ψı is given by:
ψı = χı + T`ı, (2)
9We will henceforth use the terms “rebellion” and “conflict” interchangeably, since conflict in our model emerges as groups
of citizens rise against existing institutions.
10We take groups as given, for simplicity, but in an earlier version of the paper (Campante, Do and Guimaraes 2013) we
show a model where group formation is endogenous.
11One possible interpretation for y∗ is that, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), a successful rebellion leads to a democracy,
in which resources are equally divided among all groups, so that y∗ = Y ∗/n (possibly up to a constant).
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where T ∈ (0, χ) is a positive constant that embodies our key assumption: it is more costly for groups
who are far from the capital (`ı = 1) to launch a rebellion. This provides us with a simple shortcut for
capturing the special role played by the capital city in rebellions against existing institutions. The random
variable χı captures fluctuations in the cost of putting together a rebellion, as well as the ability to solve
the collective action problem for effective insurrection. For each group ı, χı is drawn from a distribution
described by a continuous p.d.f. f(·) and c.d.f. F (·), with full support over [χ, χ] such that 0 < χ < χ,
independently across groups. We impose T < χ, so that the cost of being away from the capital, by itself,
is never more important than all other costs involved in rebelling against the rulers.
A conflict involving group ı arises if it pays off for that group (γı ≥ 0), and we further assume that,
conditional on that conflict arising, the probability that it will dislodge the incumbent regime is given
by pi(γı), with pi(0) = 0 and pi
′ > 0.12 Put simply, this captures the idea that the rebellion effort will
increase with the potential payoff, and that the likelihood of the rebellion succeeding in overthrowing the
incumbents in increasing in that effort. (We again refer to Appendix A for microfoundations.)
The timing of the model is as follows: incumbents choose the share of output to be left to each group.
Then the variables χı are realized, conflict may occur, and payoffs are realized. If there is conflict, ousted
incumbents obtain a payoff normalized to zero. In the absence of conflict, everyone collects the payoff
stipulated by incumbents.
3.1.2 The Incumbents’ Problem
The incumbent elite want to maximize the expected rents of their representative member, assumed to be
risk-neutral, subject to the constraint that dissatisfied groups of citizens may rise up to overthrow them.
Given the conflict technology, the objective function is given by:
R =
1
p
(
Y ∗ −
n∑
ı=1
wı
)
n∏
ı=1
H(wı),
where the term in brackets are the rents incumbents obtain conditional on keeping power, to be shared
among the measure p of incumbents, and H(wı) denotes the probability that they are not overthrown by
group ı. The trade-off is that a smaller wı implies higher rents for the incumbents in case they keep their
power, but raises the risk of a successful rebellion.
It is convenient to proceed with a change of variables, by defining χ̂ı such that γı ≥ 0 (i.e. group ı will
rebel) if χı ≤ χ̂ı:
χ̂ı ≡ y
∗
wı
− T`ı. (3)
For a given group , a larger χ̂ is associated with a lower income, conditional on that group’s isolation
with respect to the capital. Intuitively, we can thus think of χ̂ as a measure of “relative squeeze” of group
 by the incumbents: how much that group’s rents are pushed down, relative to its rebellion potential.
12We further assume that pi(γı) = 1 for high enough γı, so that citizens always get a positive income wı.
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The function H can then be expressed, with a slight abuse of notation, as a decreasing function of χ̂ı
only:
H(χ̂ı) = 1−
∫ χ̂ı
χ
pi (χ̂ı − χı) f(χı)dχı.
We also define the function h as:
h(χ̂) ≡ −∂H(χ̂)
∂χ̂
=
∫ χ̂ı
χ
pi′ (χ̂ı − χı) f(χı)dχı. (4)
which lets us define the hazard rate hH – roughly speaking, the rate at which the incumbent regime is
overthrown by a given group j, based on a marginal increase in its relative squeeze χ̂.
Using (3), we can rewrite the objective function as:
R =
1
p
(
Y ∗ −
n∑
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı + T`ı
)
n∏
ı=1
H(χ̂ı) (5)
The optimal incumbents’ choice can thus be simply represented by a set of thresholds χ̂ı: the incumbents
decide how much each group is to be squeezed in equilibrium.
3.1.3 Results
Proposition 1 summarizes the key results of this simple model.
Proposition 1 Suppose hH is an increasing function. In equilibrium, χ̂ı = χ̂C and wı = wC for all groups
ı in C , and χ̂ı = χ̂F and wı = wF for all groups ı in F . Unless all groups always rebel, we have:
13
(i) χ̂C > χ̂F : A group in C is more likely to rebel than a group in F .
(ii) H(χ̂F ) > H(χ̂C): Successful rebellions are more likely to come from a group in C than from a group
in F .
(iii) For each ı, an increase in `ı reduces the risk of conflict and the risk of a successful conflict.
(iv) wCwF > 1 and increasing in T : The income of those in C is larger than income of those in F , and
this premium is increasing in T .
Proof 1 See Appendix B.1.
Parts (i) and (ii) of this Proposition encapsulate the central results of our model: incumbents will
allow for more conflict to emerge close to the capital, even though these rebellions are more dangerous for
them. Intuitively, this follows from the basic logic of the model: groups that have an easier time organizing
a successful rebellion – namely, those who are closer to the capital – represent a greater threat to the
incumbent elite. It is thus relatively expensive for incumbents to buy an extra amount of stability from
13It is possible to have a corner solution such that χ̂C = χ̂F = χ and all groups always rebel, but this case is evidently not
interesting for our purposes.
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them: it takes a large amount of extra consumption to keep them quiet, even for a relatively bad draw of
χı. Hence, incumbents will optimally choose to live with a greater probability of revolt by citizens who
are closer to the capital, as opposed to further reducing their rents in order to bring down that threat.
This intuition can be seen most clearly by walking through the logic of the incumbents’ decision.
Taking the derivative of (5) with respect to χ̂ and rearranging yields:
∂R
∂χ̂
=
1
p
n∏
κ=1
H(χ̂κ)
[
y∗
(χ̂ + T`)2
−
(
Y ∗ −
n∑
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı + T`ı
)
h(χ̂)
H(χ̂)
]
(6)
where h(χ̂) is given by (4). With a slight abuse of language, we can define the first term in square brackets
as the marginal benefit of an increase in χ̂:
MgB(χ̂) =
y∗
(χ̂ + T`)2
. (7)
This captures the incumbents’ gains from reducing the income of those in group , thereby increasing their
own rents. This marginal benefit is clearly decreasing in χ̂ı and `: isolated groups are less threatening
and thus cheaper to buy off, hence a marginal increase in χ̂ leads to a smaller reduction in their income,
and correspondingly smaller gains to the incumbents.
On the other hand, the marginal cost of increasing χ̂ı, namely the second term in square brackets in
(6), corresponds to the increased probability of losing power:
MgC(χ̂) =
(
Y ∗ −
n∑
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı + T`ı
)
h(χ̂)
H(χ̂)
. (8)
For a given χ̂, this marginal cost is naturally independent of the location of group . The assumption
that the hazard rate hH is increasing in χ̂ – capturing the natural idea that the rate at which the
incumbent regime is overthown by group  is increased when that group is squeezed further, increasing its
dissatisfaction – implies that the marginal cost curve is increasing.14
The choice of χ̂ for group  is sketched in Figure 1.
15 The marginal benefit curve for those in F
(MgBF ) is below the marginal benefit curve for those in the capital city (MgBC). Figure 1 shows that,
as a result of that, we must have χ̂C > χ̂F , as per part (i) of the Proposition.
Figure 2 in turn shows the implications of the result for the odds of conflict and the probability that
it will succeed in dislodging the incumbent regime. The curve on the right shows the probability of a
successful rebellion for a group in C . The curve on the left shows the probability of a successful rebellion
for a group in F , and is a translation of the former curve. The set of values of χı that trigger conflict
is larger for those in the capital city, and for a given χı, the probability of success is always larger for
conflict in the capital, as per part (ii) of the Proposition.
14Since H is decreasing in χ̂ı, an increasing function h is a sufficient condition for an increasing h/H. The function h,
as can be seen in (4), is the integral of a positive function from χ to χ̂ı, so the range of the integral is increasing in χ̂ı –
actually, h(χ) = 0 because the risk associated with an increase in the likelihood of conflict is negligible at that point. As a
consequence, h is indeed increasing for a large set of specifications – in particular, if pi is linear or convex (for any distribution
f) or for uniform distribution f (and any function pi).
15Strictly speaking, the marginal cost curve is not the same for all groups, due to the denominator of the fraction inside
the sum in (8). However, in equilibrium, the marginal cost of increasing χ̂ is given by (8) evaluated at χ̂, and the value of
the sum is the same for all groups. Hence Figure 1 is helpful to illustrate the trade-off faced by the incumbents.
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Figure 1: The choice of χ̂
 

CF
Figure 2: Probability of a successful rebellion
Closely related is the additional implication that a more isolated capital city is associated with less
conflict and a lower risk for incumbent elites (part (iii) of Proposition 1). Consider an increase in `κ
(say from 0 to 1) for some κ. Inspection of (8) shows that the marginal cost of increasing χ̂ shifts up:
intuitively, it is easier for incumbents to get rents, so they are less willing to face risks. The increase in `κ
will also reduce the marginal benefit of increasing χ̂κ – it is cheaper to buy their loyalty when they pose a
smaller threat. It can be seen from Figure 1 that these movements would lead to lower values of χ̂, and
hence more security. Put simply, insofar as conflict poses a greater threat to incumbents when it takes
place closer to the seat of power, an isolated capital offers them protection.
The final item in Proposition 1 (part (iv)) shows that those who pose a greater threat end up obtaining
more rents in equilibrium. In other words, although they are squeezed further relative to their rebellion
potential (that is, χ̂C > χ̂F ), their advantage means that they still end up better off in absolute terms
(wC > wF ). The intuition is quite clear; formally, this is because the marginal benefit from increasing χ̂C
will be larger than the marginal benefit from increasing χ̂F .
16 Inspection of (7) shows that the marginal
16In Figure 1, the curve MgC will cross MgBC at a point that is higher than its intersection with MgBF .
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benefit is equal to w2 /y
∗. This means that an increasing marginal cost curve is a sufficient (and far from
necessary) condition for a larger income in the capital city. This capital city premium is increasing in T ,
because a higher T represents an increasing advantage of those in the capital over those who are far away,
in terms of the threat they pose to incumbents.
3.2 Capital Cities and Quality of Governance
We must take into account, however, that the degree of isolation of the capital city is not exogenously
given to incumbent elites. To the contrary, the institutional environment affects the spatial distribution of
individuals relative to the capital city through a number of policy levers: from internal migration policies
and specific economic incentives to populate certain areas to, most directly, the very location of the capital
city – changes of which, as we have seen, have been fairly often considered and implemented.
We thus build on the previous model to study the joint determination of the isolation of the capital
city and the quality of governance – that is, endogenizing the choice of `ı and p. In short, besides choosing
how much to extract from citizens, the incumbents now also choose the quality of governance and the
degree of isolation of the capital.17 Both of these affect the productivity of the economy, but also have
distributional effects that feed back into the threat of insurrection.
3.2.1 Production, Quality of Governance, and the Spatial Distribution of Population
Now instead of an endowment economy, we consider a production function that depends on the spatial
distribution of population (relative to the capital) and the quality of governance. Specifically, let `∗ be the
output-maximizing degree of isolation of the capital city, which we take to be a primitive indicating the
efficient spatial distribution of population relative to the capital.18 We can take this to capture a balance
between congestion costs and economies of scale, but the specifics are immaterial: the crucial point is that
there is a cost to completely isolating the capital, and any assumption that generates such a cost suffices.
Since we have established that isolation helps protect the incumbent elite against the threat of conflict,
in the absence of such a cost the elite’s problem would be trivially solved by totally isolating the capital,
which would be both uninteresting and unrealistic.
We can then write:
Y = A(p)(Y ∗ − φ(∆`)), (9)
with
` ≡
∑
ı `ı
n
and ∆` ≡ `− `∗,
17Needless to say, in practice incumbent governments can seldom if ever simply choose where their citizens will live. One
should think of the isolation of the capital city emerging as part of a spatial equilibrium where choices are made by individuals,
but which is affected by choices of the incumbents; our assumption is a shortcut to focus on those choices.
18To fix ideas, we can think of a country where resources are geographically concentrated (say, Egypt) as one where the
optimal arrangement from a production standpoint involves a low degree of isolation `∗; a country where they are spread
over the country’s territory (say, the United States) would exemplify a case of high `∗.
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and where Y is the level of output, Y ∗ corresponds to output when ` = `∗ and φ(∆`) is the output
loss owing to a choice of ` different from `∗. We assume that φ is a convex function satisfying φ(0) = 0
(∆` = 0 is the optimal choice), φ′(0) = 0 (optimality condition) and φ′′ > 0. As for power sharing p and
productivity A, we assume that p can be chosen in the interval [p, p] with 0 < p < p < 1, and A′ > 0,
A′′ < 0 and A(p)/p is decreasing in p.19
The assumption on the productivity shifter A is the other key ingredient: productivity is enhanced
by increasing the measure of individuals in power, p. This is meant to capture the idea that sharing
power entails good governance: the provision of public goods such as protection of property rights and
enforcement of contracts require checks and balances that have to be provided by a set of civil authorities.
We interpret an increase in p as the addition of such a set to the core of the incumbent elite, and their
presence enables individuals to access better technologies that rely on the provision of those public goods.
With this assumption in mind, we will refer to p interchangeably as a measure of power sharing or of
quality of governance.
The downside of good governance, from the incumbents’ standpoint, is that sharing power requires
sharing rents with the civil authorities: all individuals in power must receive the same payoff.20 It follows
that the choice of governance embeds a crucial trade-off between having a larger pie and taking a larger
slice of a smaller one.
3.2.2 Conflict
The rebellion mechanism is essentially the same as described in Section 3.1.1, encapsulating the idea that
insurrections are costlier and less effective farther from the capital city.21 We now allow the incumbent
elite to choose each `ı from the entire interval [0, 1] for the sake of tractability, but the effect of isolation
on the difficulties involved in rebelling against the rulers can be interpreted as before.
3.2.3 The Incumbents’ Problem
Incumbents now choose not only the income of each group, but also the isolation of each group with
respect to the capital, {`ı}, and the degree of power sharing, p. Output in the economy is given by (9),
so incumbents maximize:
R =
1
p
(
A(p)(Y ∗ − φ(∆`))−
n∑
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı + T`ı
)
n∏
ı=1
H(χ̂ı) (10)
To understand the trade-offs facing the incumbents in this setting, let us consider the relevant first-
order conditions. Taking the first-order condition with respect to p and manipulating yields:
pA′(p)
A(p)
= 1−
∑n
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı+T`ı
A(p) (Y ∗ − φ(`− `∗)) (11)
19In case A(p)/p is increasing in p, there is no relevant trade-off, and it is optimal to set p = p.
20This trade-off is assumed here but arises as a result in Guimaraes and Sheedy (2013). It reflects the need to provide
incentives for individuals in power to defend (and not rebel against) the current set of institutions.
21The expression for γı is the same as in (1). Multiplying γı by some function of A would have no effect on results, since
current incumbents would take that as given.
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The LHS is the elasticity of productivity with respect to the quality of governance, and corresponds to
the marginal benefit of the latter: a larger p leads to greater productivity, and hence more output. The
RHS in turn amounts to the share of output that goes to the incumbent elite as rents, which have to be
shared among more people when p increases: the cost of good governance for the incumbents is the need
for sharing rents. Note that the isolation of the capital city affects this trade-off, because it affects how
much has to be left by the elite to citizens.
By the same token, differentiating R in (10) with respect to ` yields:
∂R
∂`
=
1
np
∏
ı
H(χ̂ı)
(
−A(p)φ′(∆`) + ny∗ T
(χ̂ + T`)2
)
In consequence, ` is given by:
A(p)φ′(∆`) = ny∗
T
(χ̂ + T`)2
(12)
The LHS of (12) shows the marginal efficiency cost of further isolating the capital. The RHS of (12) in
turn displays the marginal benefit of the extra protection bought by that isolation: a more isolated capital
makes it cheaper to stave off rebellion, as citizens who are farther away represent a lesser threat and can
thus receive a lower level of consumption. Note that the quality of governance affects this trade-off: the
more productive the economy, the larger the absolute costs of further isolation.
3.2.4 Results
We can first state the following result, stemming directly from (11) and (12), which helps build intuition
for the forces at play in the model:22
Proposition 2 In the model with endogenous location and governance:
(i) For given χ̂ı and p, the isolation of the capital city (`) is increasing in T and `
∗.
(ii) For given χ̂ı and `, quality of governance (p) is decreasing in T and `
∗.
Proof 2 See Appendix B.2.
The first statement identifies two parameters that are monotonically related to the equilibrium isolation
of the capital city: an increase in `∗ (the optimal degree of isolation) or T (the impact of distance on the
cost of rebellion) will increase `. For the latter, the intuition is that a higher impact of distance on the
cost of rebellion increases the effectiveness of isolating the capital city as a protection device, as indicated
by (12).
22As can be seen from inspecting (12), an ancillary implication of the model (again, using the assumption that h/H is
increasing) is that the benefit from increasing ` is increasing on w and, consequently, decreasing in `. Intuitively, shifting
people 20 miles away from the capital is more important for the incumbents than moving people who are already far away
to 20 miles further. This leads incumbents to choose the same `ı for all groups ı in the economy. This is an advantage for
tractability, but also makes it difficult to directly interpret the results in Proposition 1. However, assuming that some groups
cannot be moved (say, because some groups have to be in the capital city) has no effect on the results of this section, and
implies that essentially all results from Propositiion 1 hold in this model. The one exception is part (iii), which does not
apply to this setup, as `ı is now an endogenous variable.
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The second statement shows that quality of governance is decreasing in T and `. A larger T leads to
an increase in the RHS in (11), corresponding to an increase in incumbent rents. Intuitively, when the
average citizen poses a smaller threat to the incumbent regime, the latter can grab a larger amount of
output, and is thus less willing to share rents in exchange for an increase in productivity. A larger `∗ has
a similar effect.
These two statements, taken together, suggest a negative correlation between the quality of governance
and the degree of isolation of the capital city. Still, they are only “partial” results: we need to take into
account the mutual influence between p and `, as highlighted in the previous subsection. As it turns out,
we can state the following:
Proposition 3 In the model with endogenous location and governance, if the variance of F is sufficiently
small, changes in T and `∗ induce a negative correlation between the quality of governance (p) and the
degree of isolation of the capital city (`).
Proof 3 See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 3 delivers a key testable prediction, linking capital cities and quality of governance: isolated
capital cities tend to be associated with worse quality of governance.
This link between isolation of the capital city and misgovernance reflects causality going in both
directions. Bad governance increases the incentives for isolating the capital city because incumbents in
this case are relatively less worried about the costs of that isolation in terms of output losses. On the other
hand, the protection afforded by an isolated capital means that rents can be easily collected; it follows
that it is not worth increasing the productivity of the economy by improving governance, given that it
would imply distributing the rents among a larger political elite.
Note that Proposition 3 assumes a small variance of F , which effectively limits the impact of incum-
bents’ choices regarding the risk of a rebellion on their choices on the isolation of the capital and on
governance.23 Generally speaking, because a more isolated capital tends to lead to more stability, and
more stability also increases the incentives for good governance, for some particular combinations of pa-
rameters and functional forms, these effects could be so strong that increased isolation might coexist with
better governance. If the variance of F is sufficiently small, they are never strong enough to overturn the
afrementioned forces working towards a negative correlation.
3.2.5 Endogenous repression
In light of our previous results, it is interesting to ask whether there is any link between the isolation of
the capital and the level of concern displayed by incumbents regarding the threat of conflict. To study
23The expression in (11) shows that the marginal cost of sharing power is related to the rents incumbents obtain, con-
ditional of keeping power. In the model, it is actually possible that this decreases when the capital can be more isolated.
Mathematically, expected rents R always increase in T , but it could be the case that R/
∏
ıH(χ̂ı) actually decreases in T .
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this question, we extend our basic model by assuming that incumbents can spend resources to increase
their military power, in order to make rebellions more costly.
Suppose incumbents can invest in a protection technology D (for “defense”), which increases their
ability to withstand rebellion threats – we can think of that as military spending, to focus ideas. The
protection technology increases the cost of a rebellion, so the expression for ψı in (2) becomes:
ψı = χı + T`ı +D
The cost of defense D is given by δ(D), with δ′ > 0 and δ′′ ≥ 0. Rents received by each individual in
power are now given by:
R =
1
p
(
A(p)(Y ∗ − φ(∆`))− δ(D)−
n∑
ı=1
y∗
χ̂ı + T`ı +D
)
n∏
ı=1
H(χ̂ı)
and the next proposition summarizes the result of this section.
Proposition 4 If the variance of F is sufficiently small, then D is decreasing in `∗ and T .
Proof 4 See Appendix B.4.
Along with our previous results, this implies that a more isolated capital city will be associated with
lower levels of military spending. Intuitively, military spending and isolated capitals are substitutes in
protecting the incumbents: when it is cheap to obtain protection by isolating the capital – such as when
there is relatively little inefficiency in doing so (high `∗), or when isolation is effective in staving off rebellion
(high T ) – there is less need to invest in military protection.
3.3 Discussion
Our framework, relying on the connection between the spatial distribution of population and the threat
of rebellion, makes key predictions linking capital cities, conflict, and quality of governance. With respect
to conflict, we predict that:
Prediction 1 Conflict is more likely to emerge closer to the capital city.
Prediction 2 Conflict that emerges close to the capital is more dangerous to incumbents.
These results come from the basic assumption that it is easier to put together a successful rebellion against
an incumbent elite when the rebels are closer to the seat of power, which is in turn predicated on the
notion that the latter plays a key role in determining who has control over the polity. This implies that it
will be cheaper for incumbents to buy off those who pose a lesser threat, and as a result they will optimally
choose to live with a greater equilibrium threat coming from closer to the capital.
The prediction that conflict is more likely closer to the capital stands in contrast with what one might
have expected from alternative theories of conflict. For instance, to the extent that conflict is associated
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with low state repressive capacity (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003), and that the reach of weak states gets
even weaker as one moves away from the capital city (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2014), one would
have predicted that the onset of conflict would be more likely farther from the capital.
With respect to governance, we predict that:
Prediction 3 Isolated capital cities are associated with misgovernance.
The link emerges as an equilibrium outcome in which causality runs both ways. Isolated capital cities
lead to misgovernance, because the protection they afford to incumbent elites means that they can get
away with extracting more rents, thus tilting the optimal balance away from enhancing productivity and
towards concentrating rents. Conversely, misgovernance also increases the incentives to isolate the capital
city, as it means that the efficiency costs of further isolation are less important.
Since the logic of our theory works through the mechanism of insurrection threats as a check on
the behavior of incumbent elites, we would expect that the forces it identifies would be stronger in
places where that check is relatively more important. In particular, they should be less relevant in the
context of established democracies: it seems far-fetched to imagine that rebellion threats are a particularly
meaningful constraint impinging on incumbents in the US or Western Europe. This is another central
testable prediction that we can check against the evidence.
Finally, the theory also yields ancillary testable predictions, which are not as central to the logic of
the model but can nonetheless be used to further check its explanatory power. The model predicts that
the isolation of the capital city will be negatively correlated with direct measures that the elite may
resort to in order to defend against the rebellion threat. We interpret this as a negative correlation with
military spending, insofar as the latter is often driven, to a substantial extent, by a concern with domestic
rebellions.24 In addition, it predicts that individuals living in the capital city will be better off relative
to the population that is far from the capital, because of the greater political threat that they represent,
and that this will be positively correlated with the isolation of the capital city.
4 Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Empirical Evidence
We now turn our attention to the empirical evidence regarding the key predictions of our framework. We
will start by assessing the link between capital cities and conflict, which is at the heart of the logic of our
model, and then move on to the implications linking capital cities and the quality of governance.
24This prediction stands in contrast with alternative stories where the isolation of the capital is just an indication that
the country is divided in different (and possibly antagonic) regions, since in this case one would expect more investment in
protection.
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4.1 Capital Cities and Conflict
4.1.1 Data
We start by describing more extensively the variables needed to capture the main concepts needed to
test the predictions of our framework regarding conflict and capital cities. (All other variables will be
introduced as they are used, and described in the Online Data Appendix.)
Testing our key predictions regarding the likelihood and consequences of conflict as a function of
distance to the capital city requires geo-located information ond the incidence of conflict. For that we
use the PRIO-GRID dataset (Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug 2012) (Advanced Conflict Data Catalogue
(ACDC) project). This dataset makes available a number of different variables measured at the level of
0.5 x 0.5 decimal degree cells covering all terrestrial areas of the world. Each cell is, on any given year,
attributed to one single (independent) country – for cells that straddle country borders, the attribution
is to whichever independent country happens to contain the largest share of the cell’s territory.
We focus our attention on intrastate conflict, which is the kind of event our framework is concerned
with. We use as one of our main variables the dummy CivConf , coded for the years between 1989 and
2008 (Hallberg 2012), which specifies whether a cell lies within a conflict area in a particular year. Our
second key variable is Onset (Holtermann n.d.), which for every cell indicates years in which a conflict
started in that cell, and is coded for the 1946-2008 period.
The dataset contains a measure of distance (in kilometers) from the cell centroid to the country’s
capital, but the designation of capital cities did not generally track the instances of capital city moves –
we added those manually (as described in Table 1). The dataset does cover, on the other hand, changes
in capital cities due to the breakup and emergence of new countries. We will use that source of variation
as an integral part of our identification strategy, as we discuss below.25
We will also use the distance information to build a measure of how far from the capital the average
conflict is. For this, we use the axiomatically grounded family of measures of spatial concentration (or
equivalently, isolation) around a point of interest proposed in Campante and Do (2010). Specifically, they
show that a very simple and easily interpretable measure of isolation has a number of desirable properties
(and uniquely so): the average log distance to the capital city – which for shorthand we will describe as
AvgLogDistance Conflict.26 We focus on a measure of distance that adjusts for the geographical size
of the country, to allow for the possibility that a given distance could mean different things in countries
25We were careful not to include as changes in capital cities the instances in which a given cell is reassigned to a different
country simply as a result of the latter becoming independent, with no actual breakup or annexation involved. For instance,
suppose a cell happens to be on the border between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, with 40% of its territory on the former and
60% on the latter. The dataset would attribute that cell to Ghana between 1957 (when that country became independent)
and 1960 (when Cote d’Ivoire did), because Cote d’Ivoire was then coded as missing. From 1960 onwards, it would attribute
the cell to Cote d’Ivoire. In that case, we attributed the cell to Cote d’Ivoire for all years.
26See Campante and Do (2010) and Campante and Do (2014) for a more extensive discussion. A description of the index
(both for conflict and population, which we will use in the next subsection) as we actually compute it in practice, given
the data we have, can be found in the Data Appendix. An important practical issue refers to how we deal with countries
that have multiple capitals. The Data Appendix documents how we deal with these issues, but in any case the results are
unaffected by any of these choices.
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that are geographically small or large: 100 miles could be seen as a long distance in Belgium, but not so
much in Canada. That said, we will also look at a version that does not adjust for geographical size, for
the sake of robustness.
4.1.2 Conflict Is More Likely Closer to the Capital
We first consider the evidence on intrastate conflict, taking grid cells as the unit of analysis. The results
are in Table 2. All specifications in that table include an extensive set of control variables (also from the
PRIO-GRID dataset), which help us deal with a number of factors that may correlate with the likelihood
of conflict: income per capita, population, and infant mortality as measures of socio-economic conditions,
travel time to the nearest major city as a measure of broad isolation as well as urbanization, and a
number of geographic characteristics (share of mountainous terrain and forest coverage, latitude, average
temperature and precipitation).
Table 2. Distance to the Capital and Conflict: Cross-cell Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependant 
variable Average probability of conflict (CivConf) 
Interstate 
conflict Average probability of conflict onset (Onset) 
Sample Full 
Polity 
<=0 
Polity 
>=0 
Polity 
>=9 Polity <=0 Full Polity <=0 Polity >=0 Polity >=9 
                    
Log Distance to 
Capital -0.0041 -0.0279** -0.0017 -0.0014 0.0006 -8.74e-05** -0.000149** -4.81e-05 -2.24e-05 
 
[0.0048] [0.0137] [0.0053] [0.0010] [0.0006] [3.45e-05] [6.23e-05] [2.92e-05] [1.82e-05] 
          Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 46,398 9,179 37,632 12,929 9,179 46,283 26,121 20,023 12,179 
R-squared 0.856 0.875 0.850 0.838 0.487 0.056 0.053 0.072 0.047 
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at country level. Columns (1) to (5) use the indicator of ongoing conflicts in each cell, 
averaged from 1989 to 2008  where conflict data are available. Columns (6) to (9) use the indicator of conflict onsets (the start of a new conflict) 
in each cell, averaged from 1946 to 2008 where conflict onset data are available. All columns include the averages over the corresponding 
period of the following variables for each cell: log Gross Cell Products per capita (night luminosity-enhanced measures, available in 1990, 1995, 
2000, 2005), log population (available in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005), temperature, precipitation. In addition, all columns control for: infant mortality 
rates, proportion of mountain area, proportion of forest (all measured in 2000), log travel time to the nearest urban area, and cell latitude. 
Country fixed effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 	  
Our first dependent variable is the probability of conflict, as measured by the dummy CivConf
averaged over the entire available period (1989-2008). The first column in Table 2 shows the correlation
with the measure of distance to the capital city, for the full sample. We see no evidence of any link, but
the next three columns immediately show that this hides an asymmetry between more and less democratic
contexts.
In particular, Column (2) shows that countries with an average Polity score below zero – a threshold
meant to encompass “autocracies” and “closed anocracies”, as defined by the Polity IV dataset – display
a strong negative correlation: conflict is more likely in areas that are closer to the capital. Quantitatively,
our estimate of -0.0279 implies that halving the distance to capital city would increase conflict probability
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by 1.93 percentage points (= log(2) × 0.0279), or about 11% of 17.48 percentage points, the average
probability of conflict per cell in this subsample. (The standard deviation of log distance to capital in this
subsample is 0.91, corresponding to a change of distance by 2.5 times.) In contrast, relatively democratic
countries (Column (3)), and especially the strongly established democracies with an average Polity score
over 9 (Column (4)), display no correlation whatsoever.
In short, the model’s prediction is backed by the evidence, exactly in the sample of countries where we
would expect the model’s logic of insurrections as a check on incumbent behavior to be more important.
In contrast, Column (5) shows that no correlation exists between interstate conflict and distance to the
capital emerges, even in autocracies. This is reassuring, since we would not expect the logic of our model
to speak to this type of conflict.
The remainder of Table 2 considers conflict onset (Onset) as the dependent variable. We see that now
a correlation emerges, in the same direction as before, even for the full sample. Still, the pattern is once
again very different between autocracies and democracies, as the correlation holds only for the former.
Quantitatively, the estimate of -0.000149 implies that, in autocracies, halving the distance to capital city
would increase the chances of conflict onset by 0.0001, or 86% of 0.00012, the mean of Onset in this
sample.
4.1.3 Conflict Becomes More Likely When the Capital Is Moved Closer
We can go further in terms of identifying a causal link between distance to the capital and conflict by
exploiting the panel dimension of the dataset. Generally speaking, distance to the capital is constant for
a given grid cell, but there are two important kinds of exception to this rule that afford us some variation
over time. First, when the same grid cell becomes part of a different country, the relevant capital city
changes as a result.27 Second, the same is true when a given country changes its capital. As we have
discussed, there are a number of examples of the latter, and our sample also displays many instances of
the former – especially, but far from exclusively, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. To
the extent that these events are uncorrelated with time-variant grid-cell characteristics, we can consider
the effects of those quasi-random “treatments” of changing distance to the capital.28
We thus implement specifications with grid-cell fixed effects. The results in Table 3, for conflict onset,
are indeed consistent with the negative link predicted by the theory.29 Once again, the result holds only
for the non-democratic subsample. In addition, it is robust to controls for time-variant geographic factors
such as distance to the closest border, temperature and precipitation (total and variation), as well as an
indicator for famine, which have also been flagged in the conflict literature. Quantitatively, the estimate
of -0.000485 among non-democratic countries is very large. It implies that halving the distance to capital
27As argued in footnote 25, this excludes cases in which the change in assigned country is due to an arbitrary dataset
choice, with no change in actual borders.
28Note that, to the extent that a ruler’s incentives would most likely be towards moving the capital to places where conflict
would be intrinsically less likely, this would bias us against finding the sign predicted by the theory.
29The results for the average probability of conflict are qualitatively similar, but less precisely estimated. This is unsur-
prising, in light of the considerably smaller sample in terms of number of years.
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city would increase conflict onset probability by 0.000336, or about 3 times the mean of Onset in the
subsample.
	  
Table 3. Distance to the Capital and Conflict: Within-cell Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependant variable Conflict onset over time (Onset) 
Sample Baseline Polity <=0 Polity <=0 Polity >=0 
     Log Distance to Capital -0.000252*** -0.000395*** -0.000485*** 4.08e-05 
 
[9.43e-05] [0.000144] [0.000162] [5.19e-05] 
     Controls No No Yes No 
Observations 3,912,793 2,032,693 1,672,133 1,671,146 
R-squared 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.023 
Cell FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at country level. The dependant variable is the indicator of 
conflict onset in each cell, available from 1946 to 2008. Control variables include log closest distance to the 
border, temperature, precipitation and an indicator of a famine. Cell fixed effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The panel specification does have drawbacks. First, the variation is coming from a small set of
countries, which makes it more remarkable that we find robust results, but also raises natural questions
about external validity. Second, we have a reduced set of available time-varying control variables. For
instance, we cannot control for population, since the data is available only for a small subset of years, and
as such, the effect we find in Table 3 could be partly driven by population being drawn to a certain area
once it becomes closer to the capital city. In both regards, it is reassuring that the results are in line with
what we had obtained using the cross-sectional variation from the whole sample, in Table 2.
4.1.4 Conflict Is More Dangerous Closer to the Capital
We then turn to our second conflict-related prediction, namely that conflict that happens closer to the
capital is more likely to dislodge the incumbent regime. Since regime change happens at the country level,
we now consider variation across countries (as opposed to across grid cells), with the dependent variable
being RegimeChange, the five-year probability of a change in regime as coded in the Polity IV dataset.
Our key independent variable of interest is now AvgLogDistance Conflict, which captures the spatial
distribution of conflict (relative to the capital city) by measuring how isolated the capital is from the grid
cells where conflict is recorded. We discard countries for which no conflict is recorded, since it is not
obvious how to code isolation in that case, and as a result we end up with a rather small sample, with 63
countries in total.
Panel A in Table 4 shows the results when we focus on the cross-country variation, by averaging
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the variables over the entire sample period. In spite of the small sample, the model’s prediction is
again supported by the evidence. The first column shows the basic result for the autocracy subsample,
controling for the total prevalence of conflict, population, income per capita, and region dummies. The
column also examines the robustness of the result to the threat of potential omitted variable bias: the
“selection-corrected bound” is the estimate of a conservative bound for that effect, following Oster’s (2013)
procedure (in the spirit of Altonji, Elder and Taber 2005) which assumes that there is as much selection
on unobservables as there is selection on observables.30 This bound is estimated to be farther from zero
than the point estimate, indicating that the negative coefficient we find is very unlikely to be driven by
selection on unobservables.
Column (2) shows that the result remains unaltered when we correct for the inevitable selection
bias stemming from discarding no-conflict countries.31 Columns (3)-(4) display the same set of re-
sults, but using the measure of isolation that does not adjust for the geographical size of the country,
UnadjAvgLogDistance Conflict. Finally, Columns (5)-(6) then show that the pattern is once again
absent when it comes to the subsample of more democratic countries.
The spatial distribution of conflict is clearly endogenous, so we cannot interpret the coefficients in
Panel A as causal estimates. For instance, it could be the case that the very fact that a regime is wobbling
would lead to more conflict arising closer to the capital. To deal with that possibility of reverse causality,
we follow the literature that has explored the link between climatic conditions, civil conflict, and regime
change (Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004, Burke et al 2009, Bru¨ckner and Ciccone 2011). Specifically,
we exploit the variation studied by Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014), who show in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa that droughts are associated with an increased risk of civil war. We use the Palmer
Drought Severity Index (PDSI) (Palmer 1965, Dai, Trenberth and Qian 2004), which provides geolocated
measures of departures in moisture from a climatological normal.32 The measure is available at a monthly
frequency, which we aggregate up over the period for which the conflict data are available. We then
compute the spatial distribution of drought relative to the capital city, AvgLogDistance PDSI, and use
that as an instrumental variable for the spatial distribution of conflict.
The results are in Panel B of Table 4, for the adjusted (Columns (7)-(8)) and unadjusted (Columns
(9)-(10)) measures of isolation, in the sample of autocracies (Polity score below zero).33 We see significant
negative IV estimates, both for the adjusted and unadjusted measures, which are substantially larger than
the OLS estimates in Panel A. The first-stage results show that the instrument is relatively weak when
it comes to the adjusted measure, but the table shows that weak-instrument-robust inference (Anderson-
30This follows Altonji, Elder and Taber’s (2005) argument that there should be at most as much selection on unobservables
as there is selection on observables.
31Specifically, we implement a Heckman selection model using the averages of temperature, precipitation and famine as
excluded IVs in the selection equation. The first stage coefficients of the excluded IVs are jointly significant at 10%.
32See Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) for a discussion of the measure, which uses rainfall, temperature, and soil infor-
mation. It is on a scale [-15,15], with 0 being a “normal” climatic situation, and 15 and -15 indicating “extremely dry” and
“extremely wet” climate, respectively (see Data Appendix).
33The first stage is far from significant in the sample of stable democracies – consistent with the fact that the link between
climate and civil war does not seem to be important in the latter context.
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  Table 4. Conflict and Regime Change on Average Across Countries 
Panel A: OLS and Heckman selection models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 5-year probability of regime change (RegimeChange) 
Method OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Sample Polity≤0 Polity≤0 Polity≤0 Polity≤0 Polity≥0 Polity≥0 
       
Conflicts’ AvgLogDistance -1.036*** -0.939*   0.0402 0.284 
to capital city (adjusted) [0.362] [0.466]   [1.099] [0.629] 
Conflicts' AvgLogDistance   -0.470*** -0.396***   
to capital city (unadjusted)   [0.147] [0.123]   
Total # conflicts -0.000230 -0.000189 -0.000290* -0.000211 -0.000952** -0.000851*** 
 [0.000157] [0.000221] [0.000168] [0.000216] [0.000284] [0.000232] 
Inverse Mill's ratio  -0.0227  -0.0131  0.0681* 
  [0.0221]  [0.0233]  [0.0337] 
       
Selection-corrected bound -3.116  -1.232    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43 31 43 33 20 20 
R-squared 0.265 0.538 0.270 0.537 0.730 0.844 
       
Panel B: 2SLS (Draught Severity) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable Conflicts ALD (adjusted) 
RegimeChange Conflicts ALD (unadjusted) RegimeChange 
Method 1st Stage IV 1st Stage IV 
Sample Polity≤0 Polity≤0 Polity≤0 Polity≤0 
     
PDSI’ AvgLogDistance 0.0397**    
to capital city (adjusted) [0.0187]    
Conflicts’ AvgLogDistance  -2.413*   
to capital city (adjusted)  [1.283]   
PDSI’ AvgLogDistance   0.152***  
to capital city (unadjusted)   [0.0474]  
Conflicts' AvgLogDistance    -0.961** 
to capital city (unadjusted)    [0.376] 
Total # conflicts -0.000261*** -0.000600 -0.000638*** -0.000589* 
 [0.0000701] [0.000393] [0.000147] [0.000336] 
     
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43 43 43 43 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 4.496 - 10.243 - 
Anderson-Ruben test χ2(1)  6.84  9.32 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value  0.0089***  0.0023*** 
R-squared 0.502 0.083 0.481 0.101 
Robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is the indicator of regime change within 5 years, averaged over time for each 
country. Heckman selection models use the averages of temperature, precipitation and famine as excluded IVs in the selection equation. All 
regressions control for averages of log GDP per capita and log population. Columns (1), (2), (5), (6), (7) and (8) control for the max distance 
from a cell in each country to its capital city. World region fixed effects are included. Columns (1) and (3) show the bound from 0 with Oster’s 
(2013) correction when selection by unobservables equals selection by observables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Rubin test) delivers similar results. As long as the exclusion restriction is valid – namely, that the spatial
distribution of drought conditions would only affect the probability of regime change through its effect on
the likelihood of conflict – we may interpret these estimates as causal. In any case, the IV results suggest
that the link between conflict closer to the capital and a greater probability of regime change is no mere
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artifact, nor purely driven by reverse causality.
Our next step is to make use of the panel variation in the conflict and regime change data, in Table 5.
Specifically, this table mirrors the specifications in Panel A of Table 4, but using the variation ove time
instead of country averages, and including country fixed effects to control for unobserved, time-invariant
factors. We see in Columns (1)-(2) that when conflict becomes more concentrated around the capital, the
likelihood of regime change goes up, in the subsample of autocracies. Columns (3)-(4), in contrast, show
yet again that democratic countries display no relationship, and Columns (5)-(6) confirm the basic result
with the unadjusted measure of isolation.34
	  
Table 5. Conflict and Regime Change within Countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 5-year probability of regime change (RegimeChange) 
Method OLS Heckman OLS Heckman OLS Heckman 
Sample Polity <=0 Polity <=0 Polity <=0 Polity <=0 Polity >=0 Polity >=0 
              
Conflict AvgLogDistance -0.859* -0.972* 
  
0.707 0.434 
       to capital city (adjusted) [0.478] [0.492] 
  
[2.206] [2.211] 
Conflicts' AvgLogDistance 
  
-1.143** -1.245** 
         to capital city (unadjusted) 
  
[0.538] [0.557] 
  Log total # conflicts 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.0922 0.101 
 
[0.0271] [0.0272] [0.0265] [0.0266] [0.0629] [0.0698] 
Inverse Mill's ratio 
 
0.255 
 
0.0901 
 
0.533 
  
[0.760] 
 
[0.634] 
 
[0.633] 
       Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 309 285 309 285 177 141 
R-squared 0.462 0.474 0.459 0.470 0.391 0.380 
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at country level. The dependent variable is the indicator of regime change 
within 5 years. Heckman selection models use annual temperature, precipitation and famine (averaged over grid cells) as 
excluded IVs in the selection equation. All regressions control for log GDP per capita and log population. Columns (1), (2), 
(5), and (6) control for the max distance from a cell in each country to its capital city. Country fixed effects are included. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4.2 Capital Cities and Quality of Governance
4.2.1 Data
In order to test our predictions linking isolated capital cities and misgovernance at the country level, we
need measures of quality of governance and of the degree of isolation of country capitals.
In order to measure quality of governance across countries, we resort to the well-known and widely
used Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), from the World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi,
2010). They aggregate information, from a number of different sources ranging from surveys of households
and firms to assessments from NGOs, commercial providers and public organizations, into six different
measures: Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Con-
34We do not include IV panel results, as the variation in drought conditions is too noisy for the IV to work in the within-
country dimension.
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trol of Corruption, and Political Stability. Since the year-to-year variation in the quality of governance
measures is not very meaningful, we will average them over time for the entire period for which the WGI
are available (1996-2012, bi-annually until 2002). To make things as simple as possible, and making use
of the fact that these individual measures are very highly correlated with one another, we will summarize
them in a single number, using the first principal component of the six measures taken together.35
When it comes to measuring how isolated a capital city is, we use the measure of AvgLogDistance,
now computed using gridded population data. (We again use both adjusted and unadjusted versions
for robustness.) We compute the measure using the database Gridded Population of the World (GPW),
Version 3 from the Socio-Economic Data Center (SEDC) at Columbia University. This dataset, published
in 2005, contains the information for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000, and is arguably the most detailed
world population map available. Over the course of more than 10 years, these data are gathered from
national censuses and transformed into a global grid of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately 5km, or
3 miles), with data on population for each of the cells in this grid. As it turns out, the autocorrelation
in the measure of population concentration is very high across the ten-year period in question. For this
reason, we choose to focus on AvgLogDistance as computed for the one year, 1990, that is judged by the
SEDC as having the highest data quality. 36
4.2.2 Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance
The raw data, as displayed in Figure 3, show a negative correlation between the first principal component
of the six WGI governance measures and AvgLogDistance, our benchmark measure of isolation. The
systematic evidence in Table 6 confirms this message, in Columns (1)-(2). (All tables henceforth report
coefficients estimated for the standardized variables, so that they should be interpreted in terms of standard
deviations, as computed for the full sample.) The correlation is statistically significant, and robust to
a wide range of control variables that are often associated with governance – ranging from GDP per
capita, urbanization, and population, to ethnic fractionalization and characteristics of the political system
(such as the presence of majoritarian elections or of a presidential system), as well as regional and legal
origin dummies.37 (All control variables in our analysis are averaged over the same period for which the
35The correlation between the different average measures, in our sample of 178 countries, is never below 0.73, and typically
far above 0.8. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin overall measure of sampling adequacy is 0.896, indicating that a principal components
analysis is warranted.
36We limit our analysis to countries with more than one million inhabitants, since most of the examples with extremely
high levels of concentration come from small countries and islands. In addition, all of our analysis will exclude Mauritius,
because it is an outlier in terms of the concentration of population. As it turns out, our results are made stronger by its
inclusion, so we want to make sure that nothing is driven by this specific case.
37Our results are also robust to including educational achievement as a control variable, as measured by total years of
schooling in 1995 (from the Barro-Lee dataset). We choose not to include it in our main specifications because it is very
highly correlated with income per capita (around 0.75 in the full sample), and ends up being statistically insignificant in all
specifications. The results are also unaltered if we control directly for population density, which we do not do in the main
specifications because we already include a control for population and the adjustment for country size implicit in our measure
of concentration. Last but not least, the results are robust to including a comprehensive set of geographical and historical
control variables, including an island dummy, length of coastline, date of independence, and presence of natural resources.
All of these can be seen in Appendix Table 1.
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governance measure is calculated, 1996-2006, unless noted otherwise.)
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Figure 3: Governance and Isolation of the Capital City
	  
Table 6. Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dep. Var.: WGI PC         
          
 Full Sample Autocracies Establ. Democracies Full Sample 
Avg Log Distance -0.1610*** -0.1430*** -0.2670*** -0.3219*** -0.0585 -0.0095 -0.0592 -0.0584 
 [0.057] [0.054] [0.066] [0.049] [0.121] [0.137] [0.064] [0.064] 
Avg Log Distance X Autocracy       -0.2316*** -0.2420*** 
       [0.081] [0.082] 
Basic Set of Controls X  X  X  X  
Full Set of Controls  X  X  X  X 
         
Selection-corrected bound -0.137 -0.124 -0.260 -0.338   -0.207 -0.235 
Observations 127 127 36 36 31 31 127 127 
R-squared 0.823 0.830 0.829 0.884 0.898 0.916 0.869 0.870 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Z-scores (normalized variables) reported. 
 WGI PC: First Principal Component of Worldwide Governance Indicators measures (Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Control of Corruption, Political Stability). 
Autocracies: Polity <=0; Established Democracies: Polity > 9.  
Basic Control variables: Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Urbanization, and Region and Legal Origin dummies. Full Set of Controls adds Majoritarian and Presidential 
system dummies, and Ethnic Fractionalization. Columns (7)-(8) also include Autocracy dummy as control variable. 
Conservative bounds of effects are calculated following Oster (2013) and Altonji et al (2005) in assuming equal selection on observables and selection on unobservables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
As it turns out, this broad pattern again masks differences between democracies and non-democracies,
as suggested by the theory. To see this, we can again focus on the threshold of Polity score equal to
zero, which here translates roughly into the bottom tercile of our sample, and compare it with the set of
full-fledged, established democracies, as defined by a Polity score above 9. Figure 4 shows the scatterplots
for the two subsamples: there is essentially no correlation in the group of established democracies, whereas
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a negative association emerges in the sample of autocracies.38
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Figure 4: Governance and Isolation of the Capital City: Autocracies vs Established Democracies
This central message is underscored by the systematic evidence in the remainder of Table 6. Columns
(3)-(4) show that the negative correlation between isolated capitals and the quality of governance is indeed
particularly pronounced in the non-democratic countries, in spite of the relatively small sample size. The
results are again robust to correcting for selection on unobservables, as the estimated bounds are very
close to the point estimates.39
This pattern is in stark contrast with Columns (5)-(6), which show that the correlation is essentially
non-existent in countries with established democracies. In fact, in spite of the relatively high standard
38The correlation, as well as all the regression results that follow, are robust to the exclusion of Singapore, which seems to
be an outlier in terms of governance among the countries in this subsample.
39Both Oster (2013) and Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) argue that, in practice, selection on observables is expected to
be of a smaller magnitude than selection on unobservables, in which case our results should be even more robust to omitted
variable bias. To put it differently, there has to be a very large ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables
to be able to fully explain away the negative coefficient of interest – for instance, for Column (2) the ratio must exceed 4.5.
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errors, especially in the sample of democracies, we can specifically reject the hypothesis of equality of
coefficients on the concentration of population around the capital across the two subsamples (p-value =
0.0018). Last but not least, Columns (7)-(8) show that the same message is conveyed by the full sample,
if we include an interaction term between the isolation measure and an autocracy dummy. Put simply,
the key prediction of our model linking isolated capitals and misgovernance is also borne out by the data.
The same pattern can be seen using a more flexible, semi-parametric approach. Specifically, we
can model the potentially heterogeneous effect of the isolation of the capital on the quality of gover-
nance as a non-parametric function of the Polity measure (denoted as p): WGIi = α(pi) + β(pi) ∗
AvgLogDistancei +XiΓ + i, where Xi stands for the basic control variables as in Column (1) of Table 7.
For each value of p along a 50-point grid over the [−10, 10] range, we run a local linear regression of WGIi
on AvgLogDistancei, using the Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 10, to obtain an estimate of
β(p).40 The resulting function is plotted in Figure 5. We can see a patern in which a significant negative
coefficient is found for relatively autocratic countries, at the lower end of the range, while for the more
democratic countries the coefficients are much smaller in absolute value, and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Notably, the threshold falls right around around the Polity score of zero that separates the
regimes classified as autocracies and closed anocracies.FIGURE 3. Governance and Isolation of the Capital City, by Polity Score 
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Figure 5: Governance and Isolation of the Capital City, by Polity Score
We can also assess the quantitative importance of the correlation. Since we report standardized results,
40The observed pattern is much similar across a wide range of cross-validated bandwidths (see Li and Racine 2006, ch. 2).
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it is easy to interpret the coefficients in Table 6: a one-standard-deviation increase in the isolation of the
capital (computed over the distribution for the entire sample) is associated with a decrease in the measured
quality of governance of just over 0.3 standard deviation, in the context of the full specification for the
non-democratic subsample (Column (4)). To make this more concrete, consider the thought experiment
of increasing the isolation of the capital from about average among autocracies (approximately that of
Nairobi in Kenya) to one standard deviation above it (roughly that of Sudan’s Khartoum). As it turns
out, the quality of governance in Kenya is also measured as about average for our sample of autocracies,
whereas Sudan’s is among the very worst in the world – better only than Iraq, Afghanistan, and Liberia.
The estimated coefficient suggests that the increase in isolation would be associated with a decrease in the
quality of governance that corresponds to about 40% of the actual difference between the two countries.
This is not a causal estimate of the impact of increasing isolation, of course, and our theory itself is explicit
about the presence of reverse causality; still, this suggests that the mechanism linking accountability and
isolation via the threat of conflict is important from a quantitative perspective.
4.2.3 Robustness
The association between isolated capital cities and poor governance, as well as the fact that it is present
only in relatively non-democratic contexts, also holds under different ways of measuring the degree of
isolation of the capital and the quality of governance.
We consider three alternative measures of isolation: (i) the “unadjusted” version of AvgLogDistance;
(ii) the (log of the) distance between the actual capital and the least isolated place in the country;41; and
(iii) capital primacy, namely the share of the country’s population living in the capital city as officially
delimited, which is an inverse measure of isolation. The pairwise correlations between these variables and
(adjusted) AvgLogDistance in our sample – 0.62, 0.59, and -0.37, respectively – clearly show that the
measures are related, as expected, but substantially different nonetheless. In particular, capital primacy
is a rather unsatisfactory measure, as it relies on arbitrary definitions of what counts as the capital city
and discards all the information on the spatial distribution outside of that arbitrarily delimited city, and
the lower correlation underscores that it is indeed noisier. Still, it is sufficiently common so as to warrant
checking, for the sake of completeness. As for the quality of governance, we use another measure, the Rule
of Law index compiled by Freedom House, which also gives us a sufficiently wide coverage in terms of
the number of countries – and particularly of non-democratic ones. (We rescale the index so that higher
scores correspond to better governance.)
The results are shown in Table 7. Columns (1)-(4) reproduce the specifications for autocracies and
established democracies, respectively from Columns (4) and (6) in Table 6, but looking at unadjusted
AvgLogDistance and the distance to the least isolated place, respectively, as key independent variables.
41Notably, for most countries the least isolated location is the country’s largest city, which often turns out to be the capital
city itself. The exceptions are illustrative: in China, it is close to Zhengzhou, the largest city in that country’s most populous
province (Henan); and similarly for India, where it is also in the most populous state (Uttar Pradesh). In the US, it is
Columbus, OH, right in the middle of the large population concentrations of the East Coast and the Midwest.
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  Table 7. Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dep. Var.: WGI PC WGI PC WGI PC WGI PC WGI PC WGI PC FH FH WGI PC 
 Autocracies Democracies Autocracies Democracies Autocracies Democracies Autocracies Democracies Full Sample 
Avg Log Distance (unadj.)  -0.4499*** 0.1018        
 [0.115] [0.308]        
Distance Min. Isolation   -0.2277*** 0.0364      
   [0.058] [0.082]      
Capital Primacy     0.1137 -0.1679**    
     [0.070] [0.076]    
Avg Log Distance       -0.2009** 0.0066 -0.0057 
       [0.080] [0.025] [0.070] 
Avg Log Distance X 
Autocracy         -0.2736*** 
         [0.096] 
Avg Log Distance (Other 
Largest)         -0.1489* 
         [0.081] 
Avg Log Distance (Other 
Largest) X Autocracy         0.0714 
         [0.116] 
          
Selection-corrected bound -0.474  -0.244  0.0783  -0.227  -0.272 
Observations 36 31 34 31 32 31 35 29 126 
R-squared 0.859 0.918 0.846 0.918 0.846 0.928 0.611 0.891 0.877 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Z-scores (normalized variables) reported.  WGI PC (Columns (1)-(6) and (9)): First Principal Component of Worldwide Governance Indicators measures  
(Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, Political Stability). FH (Columns (7)-(8)): Freedom House Rule of Law Index.  
Autocracies: Polity <=0, except for Column (5) where the threshold is the median Polity score (<=6); Established Democracies: Polity > 9.  Control variables: Log GDP per capita, Log 
Population, Urbanization, and Region and Legal Origin dummies, Majoritarian and Presidential system dummies, and Ethnic Fractionalization; and Log Land Area and Maximum Distance in 
the Country (Log of maximum distance (in km) between capital city and any point in the country), for Columns (1)-(4) only.  Column (9) also includes Autocracy dummy as control variable. 
Columns (1), (3), (5), (7) and (9) show the bound from 0 with Oster’s (2013) correction when selection by unobservables equals selection by observables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In both cases we see a similar negative, statistically significant correlation between isolated capital cities
and quality of governance, for the autocracy subsample only. Note that the results are not too far,
quantitatively speaking, from what we found in our baseline.
Columns (5)-(6) then consider the coarser measure, capital primacy. Unfortunately, our data on capital
city populations is considerably more sparse, so in order to obtain reasonable sample sizes we consider
an “autocracy” threshold at the median Polity score in our distribution (equal to 6). This includes what
the Polity dataset classifies as “open anocracies” (Polity score between zero and 5), as well as a few
less established “democracies”. We see a positive coefficient (p-value: 0.122), only for the subsample
of autocracies (Column (3)). Note also that the estimated coefficients are considerably smaller and less
precisely estimated, consistent with substantial measurement error being introduced by the coarseness of
the measure.
In addition, Columns (7)-(8) repeat the same exercise with the Freedom House measure of governance
– reverting back to using our standard zero threshold for autocracies, and AvgLogDistance as our key
independent variable. The results are very much consistent, which is unsurprising given that the measures
of governance are very highly correlated (in excess of 0.80). Still, and particularly with our small samples,
it is reassuring to learn that the results are not very sensitive to that choice of measures.
The last column in Table 7 then addresses a different robustness exercise: whether the results are
indeed driven by the role of the capital city itself, as opposed to other correlated features of the spatial
distribution of population. Specifically, it could be that relatively isolated capital cities often correspond to
the existence of a major economic center away from the capital, like Istanbul or Sa˜o Paulo or Lagos. This
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could be associated with another elite based in that other city, which might be conducive to misgovernance
in different ways – say, through their own predatory behavior, or through disputes with the political elites
situated in the capital. In order to check that our results are not driven by this type of mechanism, we
compute our measure of isolation AvgLogDistance with respect to the largest city in each country, other
than the capital itself (as of 2000).42 Column (9) shows, using a specification akin to that of Column (8)
in Table 6, that our results are essentially unaffected, qualitatively or quantitatively, when we control for
the degree of isolation of the other largest city.43 This suggests that what we find indeed relates to the
special role of the capital city.
4.2.4 Unpacking Governance
We can further assess the reach of the explanatory power of the theory by unpacking the different di-
mensions that go into measures of governance. Consider first the different component measures of the
WGI. As we have noted, the six measures are highly correlated with one another, and in light of that one
might expect that they would display a similar relationship with the isolation of the capital if considered
separately. As it turns out, this is true of five of the six measures, but not for Political Stability. Panel
A in Figure 6 shows that the coefficients obtained from local linear regressions are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero, and with no apparent difference with respect to autocracies versus democracies. This
suggests that isolated capital cities are associated with worse governance across all dimensions, except
that they are not linked to the political system being less stable.44
This is not surprising when looked at through the lens of our framework, in which isolating the capital
city is a rebellion-preventing measure. In fact, we have pointed out that the simple version of the model in
which we take isolation and governance as exogenous implies that more isolated capitals are associated with
less conflict and less risk for incumbent elites. Once we consider the interaction between political stability
and the choices of degree of isolation and quality of governance, the relationship becomes ambiguous, but
in any case we would not expect from our framework that incumbent regimes would necessarily be less
stable when the capital is more isolated.45
In contrast, this is quite unlike what one would expect from alternative stories that one might concoct
to explain the connection between isolated capitals and poor governance, such as one based on state
capacity. For the sake of an example, consider a story where, if the capital is somehow located in an
isolated place, the state has a harder time taxing its citizens and developing its fiscal capacity, the lack of
which leads to bad governance. Besides begging the question of why an incumbent regime would refrain
42This is either the country’s largest city or, more often, its second largest, since the capital is also the largest city in about
five out of six countries. The correlation between the measure and the isolation of the capital city is around 0.53 – substantial
but far from overwhelming.
43The results are the same if we split the sample between autocracies and established democracies. (Appendix Table 1).
The coefficient on the isolation of the other largest city in autocracies is small and statistically insignificant.
44The plots for the other five measures can be seen in the Online Appendix.
45To see why it would not necessarily be the case that less isolation would be associated with less stability in equilibrium,
note that it could happen that a relatively unprotected elite would still achieve stability by sharing power and rents more
broadly, thus discouraging rebellions.
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FIGURE 6. Political Stability, Log Avg Days, and Isolation of the Capital 
City, by Polity Score 
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Figure 6: Political Stability, Log Avg Days, and Isolation of the Capital City, by Polity Score
from moving its capital to a more favorable location, such a story about a relative lack of control over the
population would lead us to expect that this would be a more fragile, unstable regime.46
Another way to unpack the meaning of governance is to look at a measure of government performance
that is unrelated, at least directly, to the political incentives of rulers and elites as it pertains to power
sharing or political survival. One such measure has been proposed by Chong et al (2014), to isolate the
government’s ability to perform a simple task effectively: the average number of days it takes a country’s
post office to return letters sent to non-existent addresses in the countries’ five largest cities. Of course,
this measure ought to be correlated with broader measures of governance, not the least since one might
46This is as suggested by Herbst (2000), in a different context, with respect to low population densities in Africa.
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imagine that less accountable governments could be more likely to pursue actions that would result in
ineffective provision of services – say, by packing the post office with incompetent political appointees.
(In fact, the raw correlation with the WGI principal component in our sample is substantial, at −0.72.)
Still, we would not expect it to respond directly to the incentives highlighted by our theory.
Panel B in Figure 6 shows that, in spite of that high correlation with governance, we find no correlation
between that measure of government performance and the isolation of the capital city – and again with
essentially no distinction between democracies and autocracies. This provides further evidence that the
stylized fact we detect is not an artifact of some correlation between isolated capitals and generally low
state capacity that is unrelated to the kind of forces our theory underscores.
We now turn to the question of whether we can shed direct light on the power sharing mechanism
highlighted by the theory, by looking at the Polity IV data set. We have used the aggregate Polity measure
to parse the sample between democracies and autocracies, but the data contain more information that
can be used to study more subtle distinctions. In particular, the Polity measure aggregates the content
of several other measures – and the extent to which they can be interpreted as relating to the degree of
power sharing varies considerably.
Out of the four variables aggregated into the Polity IV index of Democracy, two are described as
pertaining to either the realm of “independence of executive authority” (ExecutiveConstraints) or to that
of “political competition and opposition” (ParticipationCompetitiveness).47 These are clearly related to
the degree of power sharing that exists within a political system: an unchecked executive and a limited
scope for political competition are clear signals of concentration of power.
A first look at how these measures relate to the isolation of the capital city can be had by revisiting the
instances of capital city moves that were listed in Table 1. Table 8 reproduces that list, excuding the cases
of partial capital moves, but also adding two columns describing the changes in ExecutiveConstraints and
ParticipationCompetitiveness from ten years before to ten years after the date of the move (or closest
date available). We see that on average there is a substantial drop in the two measures, which is indeed
statistically distinguishable from zero in the case of ParticipationCompetitiveness, in spite of the very
small sample. This indicates that the capital city moves are typically accompanied by more concentrated
power.
This pattern actually holds more systematically, beyond the extreme example of capital city moves.
Table 9 starts off, in Column (1), by looking at the aggregate Polity measure and how it relates to the
degree of isolation in autocracies. Here we extend the definition of non-democracies to include what Polity
defines as “open anocracies”, delimited by the threshold score of 5, because there is naturally considerably
less variation in the Polity components in the subset of autocracies and closed anocracies. We see a
negative correlation, showing that countries with isolated capital cities tend to display institutions that
47The former refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives” (Mar-
shall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011, p. 24), ranging from “unlimited authority” to “executive parity or subordination”. The latter
in turn captures “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena”
(p. 26), and ranges from “repressed” to “competitive”.
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  Table 8. Changes in Capital Cities and Power Sharing 
Country From To Year Δ Exec. Constr. Δ Part. Comp. 
            
Russia St. Petersburg Moscow 1918 1 -2 
Turkey Istanbul Ankara 1923 -2 -1 
Australia Melbourne Canberra 1927 0 0 
China Nanjing Beijing 1949 1 -2 
Mauritania - Nouakchott 1957 -2 0 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro Brasilia 1960 -4 -2 
Rwanda Butare Kigali 1962 0 0 
North Yemen Ta'izz Sana'a 1962 2 -1 
Pakistan Karachi Islamabad 1966 0 0 
Malawi Zomba Lilongwe 1974 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire Abidjan Yamoussoukro 1983 1 1 
Nigeria Lagos Abuja 1991 -2 -3 
Kazakhstan Almaty Astana 1997 -1 -1 
Myanmar (Burma) Yangon Naypyidaw 2005 -1 0 
      Average 
   
-0.50 -0.79 
p-value    0.266 0.021 
            
Excluding partial changes. For sources and notes, see Table 1. Changes in Polity IV variables ("Executive Constraints" and "Participation Competitiveness") are between 10 years after and 
10 years before change of capital, with the exception of Mauritania, Rwanda, and Kazakhstan ("pre" measure for first year of independence) and Myanmar (Burma) ("post" measure for 
2010, latest available). P-values for two-sided t-test of null hypothesis of Average equal to zero, with 13 degrees of freedom. 
are farther from the democratic ideal; the correlation is statistically significant at the 10% level only.
The connection is brought into sharper focus, however, when we look at the power sharing measures of
ExecutiveConstraints and ParticipationCompetitiveness, in Columns (2) and (3) respectively. The
quantitative implications are in fact very similar to what we found for our measures of governance.
	  
Table 9. Isolated Capital Cities and Power Sharing in Autocracies  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var.:  Polity Executive Constraints 
Particip. 
Compet. 
Recruit. 
Compet. 
Recruit. 
Openness 
      
Avg Log Distance -0.1831* -0.2123*** -0.3249*** -0.0554 0.1715 
 [0.109] [0.073] [0.084] [0.097] [0.225] 
      
Selection-corrected bound -0.325 -0.288 -0.414   
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.450 0.622 0.533 0.541 0.288 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Z-scores (normalized variables) reported. 
Autocracies: Polity(<=5). 
Control variables: Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Urbanization, Region and Legal Origin dummies, Majoritarian 
and Presidential system dummies, and Ethnic Fractionalization. Columns (1) to (3) include the bound from 0 with 
Oster’s (2013) correction when selection by unobservables equals selection by observables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Interestingly, Columns (4)-(5) show no evidence of a negative link between isolated capital cities and
the other two component measures (RecruitmentCompetitiveness and RecruitmentOpenness), which
have to do with “executive recruitment”.48 The measure of openness in particular, while clearly re-
lated to democracy, does not speak directly to how power is shared between different groups in society:
countries receive a maximum score in the openness measure essentially as long as succession is not hered-
48In spite of the small samples, the equality of coefficients between combinations of Columns (2)-(3) and Columns (4)-(5)
can be decisively rejected at standard levels of confidence, with the exception of that between Columns (2) and (4).
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itary.49 Naturally, all four measures tend to be correlated, so that countries with high degrees of power
sharing will typically score high in the recruitment measures as well. It is nevertheless interesting that
RecruitmentOpenness is the least correlated with the other three, and particularly so with the power
sharing measures: 0.59 and 0.47, when the pairwise correlations between the other three is never below
0.83. This suggests that it should indeed be interpreted as addressing other aspects of the institutional
setting.
4.3 Additional Predictions
Beyond the central implications of the model, with respect to conflict and quality of governance, we can
also check its ancillary predictions. We first look at the prediction that capital city inhabitants will be
better off relative to their faraway brethren, since the greater threat they represent for incumbents enables
them to extract additional rents in equilibrium, and that this advantage will be greater when the capital
is more isolated.50
To check this prediction, we obtain cross-country data, from the McKinsey Global Institute (Dobs
et al. 2011), on city-level income per capita, in 2007, for 600 cities around the world. Out of these,
77 are country capitals, and for all these countries we compute the capital city premium as the ratio
between the capital’s income per capita and the countrywide GDP per capita that we have used in the
previous analysis. By the same token, we proxy investment in military strength by the amount of military
expenditures pursued by a country’s central government, as a percentage of total central government
expenditures, averaged between 1990 and 2006 (from the World Development Indicators).51
Table 10 displays the results of a simple regression analysis along the lines of Table 6. The aforemen-
tioned data caveats aside, we see a positive correlation between the capital city premium and the isolation
of the capital in autocracies. This correlation is quantitatively considerable, being actually larger in size
than what we found in the case of governance. In other words, the inhabitants of isolated capital cities of
49This allows, for instance, the post-Stalin Soviet Union, no one’s idea of a regime with widespread power sharing, to
achieve that maximum score.
50We find related evidence that individuals who live closer to the capital report being more satisfied with what they get
from national institutions, which we report in Table A2 in the Appendix to save space. That table uses data from the
AfroBarometer, which report information on the location of respondents, at the village level, and covers countries that are
young democracies at best, where the logic of our model is a meaningful background in their institutional settings. Individuals
who live farther from the capital are significantly more dissatisfied with the national political system (Panel A). (This is true
controlling for distance to the largest city besides the capital, and for region fixed effects, which suggests that they are not
driven by the effects of isolation on monitoring or public good provision. We also control for a comprehensive set of control
variables flagged by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) as possibly correlated with trust.) In contrast, distance to the capital is
uncorrelated with measures of generalized trust and of the the degree of interest and information regarding public affairs,
which could also be correlated with perceptions of corruption (Panel B).
51The sample size is now smaller, in light of the limited number of countries for which we have data on income per capita
for the capital city (particularly among non-democracies), so we now split the sample between autocracies and democracies
according to the average of the Polity score between 1975 and 2000, using the threshold of zero. (We stop at 1975 in order to
restrict ourselves to the post-decolonization period.) This helps us obtain a reasonable sample size of autocracies, in contrast
with the more recent time period used in Tables 6-9. On the other hand, going back to this less democratic period greatly
restricts the sample of countries with a Polity score above 9. For this reason, we contrast the autocracy sample with the
set of countries with scores above zero. All in all, we are still left with a small sample, and for that reason we have to be
especially parsimonious when it comes to the set of control variables.
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autocratic countries earn a substantially larger premium over the rest of the population. This correlation
is exactly what was predicted by our model. It could certainly be the case that omitted factors are also
influencing this correlation, but it is telling that once again, as shown by Columns (2)-(3), this connection
does not extend to those countries that are more democratic, just as we would expect from our framework. 
 
 
Table 10. Isolated Capital Cities, Capital Premium, and Military Expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.:  Capital Premium Capital Premium Capital Premium 
 
Military Budget Military Budget Military Budget 
                
 
Autocracies Democracies Full Sample 
 
Autocracies Democracies Full Sample 
        Avg Log Distance 0.4158*** -0.1040 -0.0287 
 
-0.3393*** -0.0150 0.0986 
 
[0.141] [0.209] [0.148] 
 
[0.124] [0.133] [0.116] 
Avg Log Distance X Autocracy   0.4096**    -0.3912** 
   [0.197]    [0.169] 
Interstate War     
0.4441* 0.6072** 0.5975*** 
     
[0.247] [0.235] [0.192] 
        Selection-corrected bound 0.475  0.466  
-0.716 
 
-0.714 
Observations 32 32 64 
 
55 51 106 
R-squared 0.398 0.436 0.409   0.382 0.477 0.418 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Z-scores (normalized variables) reported. 
Dependent variables: GDP per capita in capital city / GDP per capita and Military Budget (Log of Share of Central Government Budget, avg. 1990-2006, WDI). 
Interstate War: dummy for involvement in interstate war between 1975 and 2007 (Correlates of War). 
  Autocracies: Polity (1975-2000) <=0; Democracies: Polity (1975-2000) >0. Control variables: Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Urbanization, Majoritarian and 
Presidential system dummies, and Ethnic Fractionalization. 
Columns (1), (3), (4) and (6) show the bound from 0 with Oster’s (2013) correction when selection by unobservables equals selection by observables. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     	  
Table 10 also shows that autocratic regimes facing a population that is more concentrated around its
capital city will spend significantly more with the military than regimes with isolated capitals. This is
exactly in line with the model’s prediction: isolated capital cities work as protection against rebellion
threats, and hence obviate the need for further protection. The same is not at all true of relatively
democratic regimes, which again reaffirms the model’s logic.52
5 Concluding Remarks
Our results underscore the importance of the spatial distribution of the population as a source of informal
checks and balances over autocratic regimes. As long as we care about the quality of governance – either
as an end in itself or as a means of fostering development – the lesson is that we ought to be especially
attentive to those countries where the spatial distribution is particularly inimical to accountability, e.g.
those regimes that are able to ensconce themselves in an isolated capital. By the same token, one should
pay attention to policies that enhance that ability, say by restricting internal mobility.
Isolated capitals in weakly institutionalized contexts should thus be seen as both a symptom and an
enabler of misgovernance. At the same time, the model also highlights that this accountability mechanism
comes at a price, since it operates via the threat of conflict and violent removal from office.53
52Of course, the use of military spending as our proxy for anti-rebellion investment is predicated on the assumption that
this kind of spending is driven to a substantial extent by this sort of domestic concern. In that regard, note that we include
as a control variable a dummy for whether the country has been involved in an interstate conflict between 1975 and 2007, as
coded by the Correlates of War dataset.
53See e.g. Campante and Glaeser (2009), on the case of Argentina.
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From a broader perspective, we can think of the spatial distribution of individuals as a source of
variation in the constraints that underpin institutional choices, but one that perhaps strikes a middle
ground between what Banerjee and Duflo (2014) term “deterministic” and “non-deterministic” views
of political economy: the spatial distribution of population is typically very persistent, but is certainly
amenable to policy intervention, and does evolve in the long run. In that sense, long-run forces towards
less isolation– say, because the capital city is a pole of attraction due to its very role as the seat of political
power – would tend to constrain governments, and work towards the consolidation of better institutions.
We should also point out that the framework we have developed can presumably be used to understand
other phenomena related to the threat of revolutions and the response of incumbent regimes to such threat.
In this paper, the variable that affects the extent to which an individual or group represents danger to an
incumbent elite is their distance to the seat of political power, but we can think of other factors that may
act in similar ways – for instance, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007) emphasize the role of education in
facilitating coordination among potential rebels. Applying our framework to these other contexts, we can
sketch a theory of incumbent regimes that may choose to pair less power sharing and worse governance
with, say, less human capital.
As a final example, we can also think about the formation and size of countries. Our framework has
taken polities as given, but it is natural to think that the tensions we have highlighted could translate
into pressures in the direction of breaking up countries. In that sense, we might think about the potential
role of the spatial distribution of population (and of different subgroups in that population) around the
capital city in affecting the equilibrium configuration of countries, as modeled for instance by Bolton and
Roland (1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003). We leave these applications as promising avenues for
future research.
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A Appendix: A simple model of rebellions
Here we provide a simple set of microfoundations for the reduced-form model of conflict described in Section 3.1.1.
Suppose the cost for an agent to fight against the incumbents is given by
(ci + dj)wi
where ci is a group specific random variable, dj is an individual specific random variable with p.d.f g˜ and c.d.f. G˜
and wi is the income of an individual in group i. This captures the idea that fighting entails an opportunity cost,
as agents could instead spend their time and energy working, so the cost is proportional to their income. As in
models of voting, it is not clear why an individual bothers to fight since it is extremely unlikely his efforts will be
pivotal, but it is reasonable to assume that the benefit from fighting is proportional to the gain in case the rebellion
succeeds:
a(y∗ − wi)
It follows that individuals will fight if:
dj < a
(
y∗
wi
− 1− ci
)
Suppose there is conflict if the measure of agents that is willing to fight in a given group (call it Ai) exceeds a bound
D, which captures the idea that a minimum disturbance is needed for conflict to be recorded in the data. Suppose
also that conflict succeeds if Ai > Di, where Di is a random variable that captures how difficult it turns out to be
for a group to win the fight, Di ∼ (D,D).
Hence there is conflict if
y∗
wi
− 1− ci − 1
a
G˜−1(D) > 0 (13)
and conflict succeeds if
y∗
wi
− 1− ci − 1
a
G˜−1(D) >
1
a
(
G˜−1(Di)− G˜−1(D)
)
(14)
Let ψi = ci + 1 +
1
a G˜
−1(D) and the LHS of (13) and (14) become the expression for γi in the main text (assuming
that ci is larger for groups in faraway places). Moreover,
(
G˜−1(Di)− G˜−1(D)
)
equals to 0 for Di = D and is
increasing in Di, so the RHS of (14) satisfies the properties of the function pi in the main text. The shape of
function pi then depends on the distribution of individual-specific shocks G˜ and on the distribution of Di which
captures the randomness involved in any conflict.
B Appendix: Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first show there is at most one set of χ̂ı such that the expression in (6) is equal to 0 for all groups ı. For that,
the terms outside square brackets can be ignored from the analysis. Since h/H is an increasing function, ∂R/∂χ̂ is
decreasing in χ̂, and increasing in the sum inside (6) involving all χ̂ı (ignoring the terms outside square brackets).
Consider the values χ̂ı such that the expression in (6) is equal to 0 for all groups ı. Consider now a change
to a different the set of values χ˜ı and suppose that the expression in (6) is also equal to 0 for all groups ı. First,
consider the case the sum inside (6) is larger for the set χ˜ı (than for the set χ̂ı). Since ∂R/∂χ̂ is decreasing in χ̂
and increasing in the sum, it has to be that χ˜ > χ̂ in order to make the expression in (6) equal to 0, for all . But
that implies that the sum inside (6) is smaller for the set χ˜ı, which is a contradiction. The arguments for when the
sum inside (6) is smaller or equal for the set χ˜ı are analogous.
Incumbents will never choose χ̂ = χ for any . It can be seen from (6) that ∂R/∂χ̂ is positive in case χ̂ = χ
for any .
Inspection of (6) then shows that the marginal effect of χ̂ on R is the same for two groups with the same `.
Hence incumbents choose the same χ̂ for two groups in the same location.
Let χ̂F be the optimal choice of χ̂κ for a group κ ∈ F . The expression in (6) then implies that ∂R∂χ̂ > 0 for a
group  ∈ C for any χ̂ ≤ χ̂κ. Therefore, unless χ̂κ = χ, it is optimal for incumbents to choose χ̂ > χ̂κ.
The first statement from Proposition 1 follows immediately, since the cumulative distribution function F is
increasing in χ̂. The second statement follows from H being decreasing in χ̂, since the probability of a successful
rebellion is given by the function 1−H.
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For the third statement, note that an increase in `ı for any ı reduces the sum inside (6), and thus shifts down
the derivative in (6). This leads to a lower χ̂ at the point ∂R/∂χ̂ = 0. An increase in ` decreases the first term in
brackets, which also leads to a decrease in the derivative in (6) and a lower χ̂ at ∂R/∂χ̂ = 0. Using the first two
statements from Proposition 1, that implies a reduction in the risk of conflict and in the risk of a successful conflict.
Finally, since χ̂C > χ̂F and h/H is increasing, h(χ̂C)/H(χ̂C) > h(χ̂F )/H(χ̂F ). Using (6), y
∗/(χ̂C)2 > y∗/(χ̂F +
T )2. Using the expression for income implicit in (3), we get that the income of those in C is larger than the income
of those in F .
To complete the proof of the fourth statement, we show by contradiction that an increase in T leads to an
increase in wC and a decrease in wF . Consider an increase in T , and first suppose wC decreases. Since wC = y
∗/χ̂C ,
that implies χ̂C increases. Hence the sum term in (6) must have increased. But an increase in the sum term in (6)
leads to a decrease in wF . An increase in T also leads to a decrease in wF (owing to h/H being increasing). Hence
wF must have decreased. But a fall in wC and wF implies a fall in the sum term in (6), which is a contradiction.
Second, suppose wF increases. Since wC has also increased, the sum term in (6) must have increased as well. That
means χ̂C must have increased, thus wC must have decreased, which is another contradiction.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
An argument similar to the proof of the fourth statement of Proposition 1 shows that income is decreasing in ` and
that the last term in the expression for ∂R/∂` (Equation 3.2.3) is decreasing in `. Consequently, there cannot be
` > `κ for groups  and κ because increasing ` and reducing `κ by the same amount and keeping everything else
unchanged would increase R. Thus `ı = ` for all groups ı. An argument similar to the used in Proposition 1 then
shows that χ̂ı = χ̂ for all ı.
The optimality condition in (12) can then be written as:
φ′(∆`) = ny∗
T
A(p)(χ̂+ T`)2
(15)
The LHS of (15) is increasing in ∆`. The RHS is increasing in T if χ̂ > T , which is implied by the assumption
χ > T . Hence for given p and χ̂, ∆` is increasing in T . Moreover ` is also increasing in `∗ (for given p and χ̂) for
suppose not: then an increase in `∗ would lead to a lower (or equal) ` and thus a larger RHS of (15) but a lower ∆`
and thus a larger LHS of (15), which is a contradition.
For the second statement, note that the optimality condition in (11) can be written as:
A(p)− pA′(p) = ny
∗
(χ̂+ T`)(Y ∗ − φ(`− `∗)) (16)
The LHS of (16) in increasing in p and the RHS is decreasing in T and `∗ for given ` and χ̂, which proves the claim.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First consider a change in T . The effect of T on p is given by:
dp
dT
=
∂p
∂T
+
∂p
∂`
d`
dT
+
∂p
∂χ̂
dχ̂
dT
(17)
The partial derivative of p with respect to T is negative (Proposition 2). The last term in (17) becomes
unimportant as the variance of f approaches zero. In order to show that the partial derivative of p with respect to
` is also negative, we need to show that the RHS of (16) is decreasing in a change in ` in a neighborhood of the
optimal ∆`. That is the same as showing that
(χ̂+ T (`))(Y ∗ − φ(`− `∗))
is increasing in ∆`. Differentiating this expression with respect to ` yields:
−(χ̂+ T`)φ′(∆`) + (Y ∗ − φ(∆`))T
Using the first order condition with respect to ∆` and rearranging leads to
T
A(p)
[
A(p)(Y ∗ − φ(∆`))− ny
∗
χ̂+ T`
]
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which is positive (since incumbents can get positive rents).
The effect of T on ` is given by:
d`
dT
=
∂`
∂T
+
∂`
∂p
dp
dT
+
∂`
∂χ̂
dχ̂
dT
The partial derivative of ` with respect to T is positive (Proposition 2). The partial derivative of ` with respect to p
is negative, because the RHS of (15) is decreasing in the productivity of the economy A(p). The last term becomes
unimportant as the variance of f approaches zero.
As the variance of f approaches zero, the derivatives dp/dT and d`/dT are given by a system of two equations
that yields the claim. An increase in T has a direct negative effect on p and a direct positive effect on `. The
indirect effects reinforce the direct effects. This argument assumes a vanishing variance of f but by continuity, the
result goes through as long as the variance of f is small enough.
Now consider a change in `∗. The effect of `∗ on ` is given by:
d`
d`∗
=
∂`
∂`∗
+
∂`
∂p
dp
d`∗
+
∂`
∂χ̂
dχ̂
d`∗
The partial derivative of ` with respect to `∗ is positive (Proposition 2). The partial derivative of ` with respect to
p is negative, as argued above. The last term becomes unimportant as the variance of f approaches zero.
The effect of `∗ on p is given by:
dp
d`∗
=
∂p
∂`∗
+
∂p
∂`
d`
d`∗
+
∂p
∂χ̂
dχ̂
d`∗
The partial derivative of p with respect to `∗ is negative (Proposition 2). The last term becomes unimportant as
the variance of f approaches zero. As argued above, the partial derivative of p with respect to ` is also negative.
Again, as the variance of f approaches zero, the derivatives dp/d`∗ and d`/d`∗ are given by a system of two
equations that yields the claim. An increase in `∗ has a direct negative effect on p and a direct positive effect
on ` and the indirect effects reinforce the direct effects. The argument assumes a vanishing variance of f but by
continuity, the result goes through as long as the variance of f is small enough.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Taking the derivative with respect to D, making `ı = ` and χ̂ı = χ̂ for all ı (Appendix B.2) and rearranging yields:
δ′(D) =
y∗
χ̂+ T`+D
This expression implicitly defines D and it is easy to verify D is decreasing in χ̂, T and `. If the variance of f
is arbitrarily small, so is the effect of T and `∗ on χ̂. The results in Proposition 3 also hold in the model with
endogenous repression, so ` is increasing in T and `∗. That yields a negative correlation between D and `.
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C Online Appendix (not for publication)
C.1 Data Appendix
Capital city population (Tables 1 and 4): See Online Appendix.
Cell-level conflict data: Cell-level data are from the PRIO-GRID dataset (Tollefsen Strand Buhaug, 2012)
(Advanced Conflict Data Catalogue (ACDC) project). Conflict data from 1989 to 2008 are from Hallberg
(2012). The dummy variable CivConf specifies whether a cell lies within a conflict area in a particular year.
Conflict onset data are from Holtermann: the dummy variable Onset indicates the year a conflict starts in a
cell. Data and detailed coding instructions are available at http://www.prio.org/Data/PRIO-GRID/.
Other cell-level data: Cell-level data from the PRIO-GRID dataset also include gross product per cell estimated
from nighttime luminosity, population per cell (both available in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005 only), distance to
border, distance to capital city, travel time to closest urban area (2008) (those variables are calculated from
GIS maps), infant mortality rates (2000), proportion of mountain area (2000), proportion of forest (2000),
precipitation, and draught. Data references are available at http://www.prio.org/Data/PRIO-GRID/.
Regime Change: Based on the variable REGTRANS (Regime Transition), from Polity IV project, meant to
capture “regime change” defined simply as a three-point change in either the politys democracy or autocracy
score. We compute a dummy equal to one if REGTRANS is different from zero, and take the average over
five-year periods between 1946-2008.
Drought Severity Index: Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), the most prominent index of drought in
meteorology and hydrology, is available at: http://webmap.ornl.gov/wcsdown/dataset.jsp?ds_id=10019.
It is based on a model of soil moisture using precipitation, temperature and the local available water content
of the soil, and captures departures from average local climatic conditions. We take the annual average of the
monthly data, and fit the index into the [-15,15] scale, where 15 denotes the driest and -15 the wettest.
Avg Log Distance: We compute the index using original gridded population maps from the database Gridded
Population of the World (GPW), Version 3 from the Socio-Economic Data Center (SEDC), Columbia Univer-
sity (2005), containing maps in 1990, 1995 and 2000 of a global grid of 2.5 arc-minute side cells (approximately
5km). The adjusted and unadjusted measures are defined respectively as 1−GCISC2 and 1−GCISC1, as
defined in Campante and Do (2010). Specifically, we have the formula GCISC1 =
∑
i s1i (α1 log(di) + β1),
where s1i is the share of the country’s population living in cell i and di is the distance between cell i’s cen-
troid and the point of interest (e.g. capital city). The parameters (α1, β1) are
(
− 1
log(d¯1)
, 1
)
, where d¯1 is the
maximum distance, across all countries, between a country’s capital (or other point of interest) and another
point in that country. By the same token, GCISC2 =
∑
i s2i (α2 log(di) + β2), where s2i is the share of
the country’s population living in cell i, normalized by log(d¯2), where d¯2 is the maximum distance, for each
country, between the country’s capital (or other point of interest) and another point in that country. The
parameters (α2, β2) are (−1, 1). In this way, GCISC2 controls for the country’s size, while GCISC1 does
not.
With respect to countries with multiple capital cities, our general rule is to consider the de facto capital as
being the site of the executive and the legislature. For instance, this means that we take the capital of the
Netherlands to be The Hague (instead of Amsterdam) and the capital of Bolivia to be La Paz (and not Sucre).
We leave South Africa out of the sample, since the executive and legislature have always been in different
cities, while keeping Chile because the legislative moved more recently (1990). As far as changes in capital
cities during our sample period, we have the cases of Myanmar (2005) and Kazakhstan (1997). We drop both
from the sample.
Avg Log Distance Conflict: Computed in the same way as above, but using the conflict CivConf grid data in
lieu of the gridded population maps. Because we use time variation, we do not drop countries that changed
capital cities. As noted in the main text, we discard countries for which no conflict is recorded, since it is not
obvious how to code isolation in that case.
Avg Log Distance PDSI: Computed in the same way as above, but using the grid data of PDSI in lieu of the
gridded population maps. This variable measures how close drought weathers are located vis-a`-vis the capital
city.
Capital Primacy Share of the capital city population over the total population, from the SEDC. Most of the
data refer to the period 2000-2002, although many countries have earlier dates.
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Distance from Maximum Concentration: This variable is calculated for each country by measuring the
distance between the actual site of the capital city, and the site of the capital that would maximize the
GCISC. The maximization is done with Matlab’s large scale search method (with analytical gradient matrix),
from a grid of 50 initial guesses evenly distributed on the country’s map for large countries.
World Governance Indicators (WGI): From Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010), including Voice and
Accountability, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, and Regu-
lation Quality, themselves a composite of different agency ratings aggregated by an unobserved components
methodology. On a scale of −2.5 to 2.5. Data are available for 1996-2002 at two-year intervals, and thereafter
on an annual basis. We average the data, for each country, for the period 1996-2012. The data are available
at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
Freedom House: Political Rights index (Freedom House). The original data are on a scale of 1 (best) to 7
(worst), which we re-scale, by subtracting from 8, so that higher scores indicate better governance. Average
between 1990 and 1999.
Real GDP per capita: From the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Real PPP-adjusted GDP
per capita (in constant 2000 international dollars).
Population: From WDI.
Polity: Polity IV composite score as Democracy minus Autocracy, on a scale of -10 to 10, from Polity IV project.
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization: From Alesina et al. (2003).
Legal Origin: From La Porta et al. (1999). Dummy variables for British, French, Scandinavian, German, and
socialist legal origin.
Region dummies: Following the World Bank’s classifications, dummy variables for: East Asia and the Pacific;
East Europe and Central Asia; Middle East and North America; South Asia; West Europe; North America;
Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean.
Executive Constraints: Variable XCONST (Executive Constraints), from Polity IV project, averaged between
1975-2010, with transition years coded as missing values. Refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints
on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities,” i.e. “the checks and
balances between the various parts of the decision-making process”: 1- Unlimited Authority, 3- Slight to
Moderate Limitation, 5- Substantial Limitations, 7- Executive Parity or Subordination. (Even-numbered
scores are “Intermediate” categories.)
Participation Competitiveness: Variable PARCOMP (Competitiveness of Participation), from Polity IV
project, averaged between 1975-2010, with transition years coded as missing values. Refers to “the extent to
which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena”: 0- Unregulated,
1- Repressed, 2- Suppressed, 3- Factional, 4- Transitional, 5- Competitive.
Recruitment Openness: Variable XROPEN (Openness of Executive Recruitment), from Polity IV project,
averaged between 1975-2010, with transition years coded as missing values. Refers to “the extent that all
the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized
process”: 0- Lack of regulation, 1- Closed, 2- Dual Executive-Designation, 3- Dual Executive- Election, 3-
Open.
Recruitment Competitiveness: Variable XRCOMP (Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment), from Polity
IV project, averaged between 1975-2010, with transition years coded as missing values. Refers to “extent that
prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates”: 0 - Lack
of regulation, 1- Selection, 2- Dual/Transitional, 3- Election.
GDP per capita in capital city: From Dobbs et al (2011), estimates for 2007. We extract the data from the
interactive map available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Urbanization/Urban world.
Military Budget: Average (1990-2006) military expenditure as a share of central government expenditures, from
WDI.
Interstate War: Dummy for presence of an instance of interstate war between 1975-2007, from Correlates of War
(COW) project.
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Individual opinion data (Table 10): Opinion data are from the 2005 AfroBarometer survey (wave 3), available at
http://www.afrobarometer.org. They come from local-language surveys of random sample of either 1,200
or 2,400 individuals in each country, including 16 sub-Saharan African countries: Benin, Botswana, Ghana,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe (South Africa is excluded from our analysis). The opinion variables are classified
into 4 types, coded from 0 (not at all/never) to 3 (a lot/always). The response on knowledge of the Vice
President’s name is coded as 1 if the answer is yes, and the respondent gives the correct name.
Additional control variables (Table 10): Control variables in Table 10 are selected in Nunn and Wantchekon’s
(2011) publicly available data, including: age, age squared, gender, urban, district’s ethnic fractionalization,
proportion of ethnic group in district, log of total historical slave export per land area, ethnic group average
malaria ecology measure, total Catholic and Protestant missions per land area, dummy for historic contact
with European explorers, dummy for historical into the colonial railway network, dummy for existence of
city among ethnic group in 1400, pre-colonial jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local community, and
categories of the following variables: education level, occupation, religion, living conditions, pre-colonial
settlement patterns of ethnicity (included as fixed effects).
Sources for population data (Table 1): www.saint− petersburg.com/history/1914− 1924.asp,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History of MoscowHistorical demographics,
http : //www.tacitus.nu/historical − atlas/population/russia.htm,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AnkaraDemographics,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IstanbulDemographics,
http://looklex.com/e.o/turkey.demographics.htm,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melbourne population growth,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics of AustraliaPopulation growth rate,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NanjingDemographics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BeijingDemographics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChinaDemographics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouakchott,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 &met y=sp pop totl&idim=country:MRT
&dl=en&hl=en&q=population+mauritania,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rio de JaneiroPopulation growth,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 &met y=sp pop totl&idim=country:BRA
&dl=en&hl=en&q=brazil+population,
http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article4,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 &met y=sp pop totl&idim=country:RWA
&dl=en&hl=en&q=rwanda+population,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sana’aDemographics,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 &met y=sp pop totl&idim=country:YEM
&dl=en&hl=en&q=population+yemen,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics of Karachi,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zomba, Malawi,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LilongweDemographics,
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9 &met y=sp pop totl&idim=country:MWI
&dl=en&hl=en&q=malawi+population,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yamoussoukro,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abidjan,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F ile : Poblaci%C3%B3n de Santiago de Chile.svg,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics of Chile,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater V alpara%C3%ADso,
http : //www.onlinenigeria.com/links/lagosadv.asp?blurb = 322,
http : //www.nbs.go.tz/takwimu/references/2002popcensus.pdf(p.10),
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlmatyDemographics,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AstanaPopulation.2FDemographics,
http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics of Kazakhstan,
http : //www.statistics.gov.my/portal/index.php?option = com content&view = article&id = 1215&Itemid =
89&lang = en,
http : //www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/651821/Y angon
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C.2 Appendix Tables and Figures
	  
Appendix Table 1. Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Additional Robustness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var.: WGI PC 
                    
 
Full Sample 
 Autocracies Democracies 
Avg Log Distance -0.0434 -0.0360 -0.0465 -0.0267 -0.2881*** 0.0348 
 [0.055] [0.056] [0.053] [0.058] [0.045] [0.134] 
Avg Log Distance X Autocracy -0.1898** -0.2180** -0.2122** -0.1957**   
 [0.087] [0.085] [0.083] [0.090]   
 
 
Additional Controls Schooling Geographical Density All 
  Full Set of Controls X X X X X X 
       Observations 113 120 127 109 36 31 
R-squared 0.875 0.874 0.871 0.882 0.884 0.930 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Z-scores (normalized variables) reported. 
WGI PC: First Principal Component of Worldwide Governance Indicators measures (Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, Political Stability). 
Schooling: Total years of schooling in 1995; Geographical: island dummy, length of coastline, date of independence, and fuel and ore exports; 
Density: Population density.  
Autocracies: Polity <=0; Established Democracies: Polity > 9. 
Basic Control variables: Log GDP per capita, Log Population, Urbanization, and Region and Legal Origin dummies, Majoritarian and Presidential 
system dummies, and Ethnic Fractionalization. Columns (1)-(4) also include Autocracy dummy as control variable. 
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Table A2. Individual Opinions and Distance to Capital Cities  
Panel A: Corruption and Politics           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Perceptions of Corruption Views on politics: 
Dependent variable President Parliament National Officials 
1st Principal 
Component 
People are 
treated 
unequally 
Careful 
about what 
you say 
              
Log Distance to 
Capital 0.0190** 0.0128** 0.0176*** 0.0352*** 0.0307*** 0.0177** 
 
[0.00776] [0.00523] [0.00495] [0.00828] [0.00791] [0.00689] 
Log Distance to 
Largest -0.0357*** -0.0333*** -0.0217** -0.0617*** 0.00463 0.0163 
      Non-Capital City [0.0108] [0.00952] [0.0109] [0.0174] [0.0172] [0.0141] 
       Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14,557 14,893 14,985 13,514 16,688 17,464 
R-squared 0.238 0.202 0.181 0.254 0.129 0.183 
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Panel B: Placebo tests 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Trust Interest and Information 
Dependent variable Trust your relatives? 
Trust your 
neighbors? 
Intra-ethnic-
group trust 
Inter-ethnic-
group trust 
Interest in 
public 
affairs 
Know VP's 
name 
              
Log Distance to 
Capital 0.000936 0.00995 0.00142 0.0157 -0.00858 -0.00078 
 
[0.0125] [0.00993] [0.00694] [0.0111] [0.00782] [0.00228] 
Log Distance to 
Largest 0.00626 0.00310 0.0172 0.00218 -0.00684 0.0128 
      Non-Capital City [0.0151] [0.0188] [0.0155] [0.0145] [0.0147] [0.00835] 
       Full set controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,129 17,099 17,052 16,895 18,032 17,115 
R-squared 0.194 0.218 0.213 0.178 0.150 0.449 
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at region level. Dependent variables in Panel A's columns (1) to (3), (5), and (6) are 
from AfroBarometer 3's questions Q56a, Q56b, Q56d, Q53D, Q53A respectively. Column (4) uses the first principal component of the 
dependent variables in columns (1) to (3). Dependent variables in Panel B's columns (1) to (8) are from AfroBarometer 3's questions 
Q84A-D, Q16, Q43C2, Q25, Q41 respectively. See Data descriptions for more details. Control variables include all control variabels 
used by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011): age, age squared, gender, urban, district's ethnic fractionalization, proportion of ethnic group in 
district, log of total historical slave export per land area, ethnic group average malaria ecology measure, total Catholic + Protestant 
missions per land area, dummy for historic contact with European explorers, dummy for historical into the colonial railway network, 
dummy for existence of city among ethnic group in 1400, pre-colonial jurisdictional hierarchies beyond the local community, and fixed 
effects for categories of the following variables: education level, occupation, religion, living conditionsm, pre-colonial settement patterns 
of ethnicity. In addition, region fixed effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 	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